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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), was decided on
March 28, 1989.

Prior to Davis, the law supported Defendants'

method of taxation.

The Davis decision profoundly altered state

taxation.
This Court should view the date of the decision as the
watershed event in deciding this case.

Neither Plaintiffs nor

Defendants could have reasonably foreseen the implications of
Davis, a decision which has exposed twenty-three states to
massive potential refund liability.

The lack of foreseeability

and surprise is evident from the failure of any member of
Plaintiffs' Class to pay their taxes under protest prior to
Davis, to ever file a petition for relief before the Tax
Commission, or to ever challenge the law in any state or federal
court.

Plaintiffs' conduct prior to March 28, 1989, is the best

proof of the revolutionary nature of the Davis decision.
Plaintiffs seek to obtain refunds for four years.
However, Davis did not mandate refunds; Davis mandated equal
treatment.

The issue of refunds was absent from the Supreme

Court's consideration because Michigan had conceded a refund if
Mr. Davis prevailed.
Plaintiffs have ignored the Legislature's special
session to amend Utah's law and the fact that Utah has now
totally implemented the rule in Davis by treating all retirees
equally, retroactive to January 1, 1989.
Unsatisfied with the legislative action, Plaintiffs now

seek the benefit of the modest exemption given to state employees
prior to Davis.

They demand 104 million dollars in refunds for

tax years 1985-1988 compared to the 8.3 million dollars benefit
given to state retirees for the same period.
The Court should view this case from the vantage point
of March 28, 1989.

The Court will see from that perspective that

Utah has complied with Davis, and that the Plaintiffs are not
entitled in law or equity to the refund they seek.

The

Legislature applied the rule in Davis expeditiously and fairly.
No further relief need be given in the form of unexpected
refunds.

Plaintiffs' demand would fiscally punish the citizens

of Utah for the modest preference to former state employees.

POINT I
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAW MANDATES TAX REFUNDS.
A.

Applying the Beam Decision.
1.

State Courts After Beam Have Found That The
Issue of Retroactivity Was Not Before the
Court in Davis. Accordingly, the Chevron
Test Mandates Purely Prospective Application
of Davis.

Because Michigan conceded a refund to the taxpayer in
Davis, the question of retroactivity was moot.
at 817.

Davis, 489 U.S.

The Court did not address it. Accordingly, Davis should

be applied prospectively.
Numerous state courts, after James B. Beam v. Georgia,
111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991), have found that Davis should be
-2-

prospectively applied.

The South Carolina Supreme Court in Bass

v. South Carolina, 23216 (South Carolina Supreme Court, January
27, 1992), found:
[I]n Davis, the retroactivity issue was not
before the Court because Michigan conceded
that the refunds were due to Davis under
state law if the statute were held
unconstitutional . . . . Furthermore, the
principle of equality or equal treatment to
similarly situated litigants does not require
that all future litigants, including the
litigants in the present case, are bound by
the stipulation of the State of Michigan in
Davis.
Three other state appellate courts, after Beam/ have
used similar reasoning to find that Davis be prospectively
applied.

See Duffy v. Wetzler, 90-07800, (N.Y. App. Div.,

January 15, 1992) ("We would also note consistently with the Beam
decision that the Davis court never applied its own rule since
Michigan 'conceded that a refund [was] appropriate . . . . ' " ) ;
see also Swanson v. North Carolina, 407 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1991)
("In Beam the Court had an opportunity to say that the rule of
Chevron should no longer be applied in civil cases, but it
declined to do so."); see also Sheehv v. Montana, 820 P.2d 1257
(Mont. 1991) (the issue of retroactivity of Davis was not before
the Court).

This Court should also decide that Davis should be

prospectively applied.
Plaintiffs assert Beam "is dispositive of the

-3-

retroactivity issue."1
(emphasis added).)

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 13,

This is doubtful in light of the post-Beam

cases discussed above.

Plaintiffs argue that Beam makes Davis

apply retroactively on three grounds.2 All of these arguments
are meaningless because the issue was not raised in the Davis
litigation.

This position supported the state court decisions

discussed above.

This Court should adopt the reasoning of those

courts.
2.

Justice Souter's Citation to Davis in
Beam Received Only His Vote and One
Other; It Should Be Given Little Weight.

The citation to Davis in Justice Souter's opinion in

1

Plaintiffs further allege that Beam is "a 6-3 opinion."
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 14.) Plaintiffs would have this
Court believe that Beam is a majority opinion. The Beam decision
caused a New York intermediate court to remark: "It goes without
saying that Beam is not susceptible to easy explanation and
requires the unsalutatory procedure, as in all plurality decisions,
of a judicial head-count." Duffy v. Wetzler, 90-07800, (N.Y. App.
Div. January 15, 1992). This Court can review Beam to determine if
it is "dispositive" and if it commands a majority of the Court.
Copy attached as Appendix.
2

Plaintiffs argue:
Under the Beam analysis, a U.S. Supreme Court
opinion is retroactive to its litigants and
thus to all others, if 1) the court applied
its decision retroactively, or 2) the court
allowed consideration of remedies, or 3) the
court
did
not
reserve
the
issue
of
retroactivity (silence).

Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 17.
-4-

Beam was a "cf."3

Plaintiffs argue "[i]f there is any doubt on

this issue [whether Davis applies retroactively], the Beam
court's citation to Davis as analogous supporting authority
should resolve the issue",
(emphasis in original).)

(Petitioners' Opening Brief at 20,

Plaintiffs mislead this Court by

arguing that the "Beam court" spoke on this issue.

The citation

Defendants refer to appears in Justice Souter's opinion.

Ill

S.Ct. 2439 (1991) (Souter, J., Plurality Opinion announcing
Court's decision).
majority opinion.

It was one of five opinions.

It was not a

Plaintiffs are asking this Court to base its

decision on dicta/ which was cryptic at best, and received only
Justice Souter's vote and one other.

It is also contrary to the

opinions of the numerous state appellate courts dealing with
Davis related actions in a post-Beam time frame.
B.

The Proper Test for Determining Whether Davis
Applies Retroactively is the Chevron Test.

A decision will operate prospectively only:
1.
3

If a new principle of law is established by

The meaning of "cf." is:
Cited
authority
supports
a proposition
different from the main proposition but
sufficiently analogous to lend support.
Literally,
'cf.' means
compare.
The
citation's relevance will usually be clear to
the reader only if it is explained.

The Blue Book: A Uniform System of Citation, 15th Edition at 23,
(1991) (Published and distributed by the Harvard Law Review
Association.) In Beam, no parenthetical explanation was given by
Justice Souter; this Court should give it little weight.
-5-

overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed;
2.

If prospective only application will not retard

the operation of the rule in question; and
3.

If retroactive application will result in

inequity, injustice, or hardship.

Chevron v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,

106-107 (1971).
1.

Davis Operates Prospectively Under the First
Chevron Factor.
a.

It is Undisputed that the "Significant
Difference" Standard Set Forth in Davis
is a New Rule of Law.

Plaintiffs do not rebut that the "significant
difference" standard in Davis is a new rule of law.

The previous

constitutional standards were uprooted by the Davis decision.
(See Defendants' Opening Brief at 57-60.) Accordingly, Davis
established a new rule of law.
b.

Davis is a Case of First Impression
Holding that § 111 Immunity From
Discriminatory Taxation is Co-extensive
With the Constitutional Doctrine of
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' position, that § 111
immunity from discriminatory taxation is coextensive with the
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity is a
new rule of law, "is incredible."
35.)

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at

They make two arguments.
First, they allege "the U.S. Supreme Court expressly
-6-

relied on a long line of cases. . . ."
Brief at 36,)

(Plaintiffs' Opening

However, Plaintiffs neither provide supporting

authority nor give an explanation of the law's development.

The

development of the law in this area is explained in Defendants'
Opening Brief.

(See Defendants' Opening Brief at 55-57.)

Plaintiffs concede, "Davis is the first case interpreting § 111 .
• . ."

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 34 n.12.)

Because the U.S.

Supreme Court had not previously considered the issues in Davis,
this interpretation of § 111 was a matter of first impression.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the "plain meaning" of 4
U.S.C. § 111 is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity from state
taxation.

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 36.)

The lack of

plainness within the context of Davis is underscored by the fact
that the statute went unchallenged for decades.

Accordingly,

this Court should find that Davis established a new rule of law.
c.

The holding that the 'pay or
compensation for personal service as an
officer or employee of the United
States' applies to pension benefits
received by employees was a new rule of
law.

In Davis, the Court remarked that "Congress could
perhaps have used more precise language" in suggesting that
current pay to federal employees constituted deferred
compensation, the taxation of which would be in violation of the
intergovernmental immunity doctrine.

Davis, 489 U.S. at 810.

Plaintiffs argue that Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524
-7-

(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984), holds
federal pensions are deferred wages.
at 34.)

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief

However, Kizas held that statutes and regulations

determine federal employees' rights; it did not discuss the
deferred compensation issue.

id.

at 534-538.

Not one of the three cases cited in Davis was decided
under § 111.

The cases lack analysis of whether retirement

benefits constitute deferred compensation.

Consequently,

Defendants could not have foreseen the new rule in Davis.
One of the cited cases held that federal pensioners are
a class distinct from state and private pensioners to whom "[t]he
United States . . . has special responsibilities and obligations
• . . that it does not have to non-federal retirees."

Clark v.

United States, 691 F.2d 837, 841-842 (7th Cir. 1982).
Consequently, disparate treatment between State and private
pensioners would appear to be a logical extension of the Clark
holding.
Plaintiffs cite Fitzpatrick v. Tax Comm'n, 386 P.2d 896
(Utah 1963), for the proposition that the Tax Commission's
position is that retirement income is deferred compensation.
(See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 34-35.)
distinguishing facts in Fitzpatrick.
Brief at 54 n.14.)

Plaintiffs ignore the

(See Defendants' Opening

Fitzpatrick was decided under common law

contract principles.
Conversely, the analysis applied to federal workers
-8-

must be based on federal statutes and regulations.
707 F.2d at 535.

See Kizas,

Plaintiffs admit that " [interpreting a federal

statute is a far different matter from interpreting the
Constitution or common law."

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 25.)

Accordingly, Davis indeed established a new rule of law by
holding that "pay or compensation for personal service as an
officer or employee of the United States" included pension
benefits.
2.

Prospective Only Application Will Not Retard
the Operation of the Davis Case.

Utah has satisfied the second prong of Chevron by
amending its statute.

No additional action is necessary.

statute is fully implemented.
retirees.

Utah's

It provides equal treatment to all

Accordingly, prospective only application of Davis is

appropriate.
3.

The Overwhelming Evidence Contained in the
Record Supports a Finding that Retroactive
Application of the Davis Decision Would
Result in Inequity, Injustice, and Hardship.

If Plaintiffs prevail, the refund is estimated at 104
million dollars.

(R. 725.)

This is in contrast to 8.3 million

dollars estimated benefit received by state retirees for the same
years.

(R. 1059 . )
Prior to the Davis decision, the legality of the tax

exemption had never been contested in Utah administrative or
court proceedings.

(R. 701, 707, 713-14, 717, 1031, 1054-55.)

The Utah State Tax Commission believed it was acting lawfully in
-9-

taxing federal retirement income based upon existing laws.
713.)

(R.

The State relied in good faith on preferential treatment

of state employees as part of a benefit program for state
employees.

(R. 701, 707.)

The State has expended the

unprotested taxes paid by retirees for years 1985-1988; the funds
are no longer available for refunds.

(R. 702, 708.)

Thousands

of other taxpayers have paid taxes on their private pension
income yet have no claim for monetary relief.

Plaintiffs insist

that other taxpayers should now pay more or suffer program
reductions so Plaintiffs can receive the benefit of the
exemption.

Nothing could be more unfair.

The equities mandate

prospective only application of Davis.
Plaintiffs fail to rebut the fiscal impact of
retroactive application of Davis on the State of Utah, and the
state's reliance on Plaintiffs' past inaction/
Exhibits A-I.)

(R. 699-789,

Instead, they argue:

When the trial court agreed and granted the
motion to strike the affidavits submitted by
Defendants, Plaintiffs did not need to
present any evidence contesting the
affidavits. Should this court determine the
trial court erred in striking Defendants'
affidavits, the proper course on remand would
be to allow the Plaintiffs the opportunity to
present evidence regarding hardship to
A

Plaintiffs ask this Court to take judicial notice of
Deseret News articles dated January 6-7, 1992.
(Plaintiffs'
Opening Brief at 64 n. 36.) Defendants Object. Plaintiffs fail to
show that this source meets the requirements of Utah R. Evid.
201(b). Plaintiffs also fail to meet the relevancy requirements of
Utah R. Evid. 401 and 403.
-10-

members of the class and regarding the second
and third prongs of Chevron.
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 29 n.9.
This request misleads the Court.

The District Court

ruled on the Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike at
the same hearing.
pp. 3-5.)

(See Defendants' Opening Brief Appendix 4 at

Consequently, Plaintiffs' claim that they did not need

to submit affidavits because the Court had already ruled them as
irrelevant contradicts the record.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides: "The adverse party
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits."
Thus, when the District Court heard the Motion to Strike, the
time had expired for Plaintiffs to file opposing affidavits.

It

would be inappropriate to ignore Rule 56 and allow Plaintiffs to
supplement the record.
C.

The Plain Language of 4 U.S.C. § 111 Did Not
Compel the Davis Holding; Statutory Interpretation
was Required.

Plaintiffs argue that this Court need not apply the
Chevron retroactivity doctrine because § 111 is plain and
unambiguous.

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 22.)

Section 111

provides:
The United States consents to the taxation of
pay or compensation for personal service as
an officer or employee of the United States,
a territory or possession or political
subdivision thereof, the government of the
District of Columbia, or an agency or
instrumentality of one or more of the
foregoing, by a duly constituted taxing
-11-

authority having jurisdiction, if the
taxation does not discriminate against the
officer or employee because of the source of
the pay or compensation.
(Emphasis added.)
The plain language of § 111 bars discriminatory
taxation "of pay or compensation for personal service."
nothing of retirement annuities.

It says

Further, it bars discriminatory

taxation of any "officer or employee" of the federal government.
It mentions nothing about former officers and employees of the
federal government.
be interpreted.

To reach such a conclusion, the statute must

Because it is subject to interpretation, it is

not plain and unambiguous.
Michigan made a similar argument in Davis.

The

majority in Davis concluded that this type of a "hypertechnical
reading of the nondiscrimination clause is not inconsistent with
the language of that provision examined in isolation . . . ."
Davis, 489 U.S. at 809.

The Court went on to construe the

statute to provide a different meaning.

Ixi. The Davis majority

also found that "Congress could perhaps have used more precise
language . . . . " in drafting § 111. JId. The dissent gave the
statute yet another meaning.
dissenting).

See id. at 818 (Stevens, J.

Also, numerous state courts have given their own

interpretations to pre-Davis § 111. These differing
interpretations of § 111 emphasize that there is no plain and
unambiguous interpretation of § 111. Accordingly, the statute is
-12-

susceptible to interpretation,
D.

It is Undisputed that the Court's Order Striking
Defendants' Affidavits, Which are Relevant Under
the Federal Analysis, Exceeded the Bench Ruling,

It is undisputed that the District Court's bench ruling
specifically struck only four of Defendants' affidavits.

It is

also undisputed that no objections were made to four additional
affidavits attached to Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Points and
Authorities In Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(See Defendants' Opening Brief at 79.)

The stricken

affidavits are relevant under the Chevron analysis.
Consequently, this Court should reverse the Order striking all of
Defendants' Affidavits.
E.

It is Undisputed that the District Court Erred in
Holding that Plaintiffs were Entitled to Tax
Refunds Pursuant to State Law.

Plaintiffs have not disputed that the District Court
erred in finding that Plaintiffs merited a tax refund solely
under State law.5

(See Defendants' Opening Brief at 39-47.)

The Plaintiffs argue that this Court should first determine the
meaning of 4 U.S.C. § 111.

(See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 9-

4 0.). They provide no grounds for a tax refund that operates
independently of that federal statute.

Accordingly, the District

Court must be reversed.
5

Defendants also rely on the state law defenses of laches
and waiver.
(See Defendants' Opening Brief at 44-47.)
As
previously argued, the District Court erred by not finding
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by these defenses.
-13-

POINT II
REMEDIES.
The remedy ordered by the District Court was draconian
and the Court abused its discretion.

Without support, Plaintiffs

assert that Defendants would not make such a claim were
Plaintiffs fewer in number.
Plaintiffs ignore the legal doctrine of this Court in
Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984).

In

Rio Alqom, this Court was confronted with the constitutionality
of a property tax statute providing for preferential treatment of
centrally assessed versus locally assessed taxpayers. After
ruling the statute in question unconstitutional, this Court went
on to deal at length with the issue of a prospective versus
retroactive remedy.

In Rio Alqom, this Court relied on other

states' case law and granted a prospective-only remedy:
These state decisions rely on the need to
preserve the financial solvency of local
government units, the great financial and
administrative hardship that would be
entailed if general retroactive effect were
allowed, and the tax authorities' justifiable
reliance on the statute, which is
presumptively constitutional. To the
objection that an unconstitutional act is
void from its inception so that everything
done thereunder must be undone, the New
Jersey Supreme Court cited the importance of
recognizing "that we are acting within the
framework of appropriate equitable relief
with respect to an unconstitutional taxation
statute." Salorio v. Glazer, 93 N.J. at 563,
461 A.2d at 1108. In fashioning an equitable
remedy, reliance interests weigh heavily, and
-14-

the court should seek a blend of what is
necessary, what is fair, and what is
workable.
Id. at 196.
In Rio Alqom, a number of taxpayers paid their taxes
under protest prior to the Court's decision.

However, this Court

directed that the holding of unconstitutionality be prospective
from January 1, 19 84, the year in which the decision was
announced.

The Court granted retroactive relief to the parties

who paid under protest, timely prosecuted their appeals, and put
the state and local taxing authorities on notice of the
constitutional challenge.

In this case, the only payments under

protest were made for tax year 1988.

Plaintiffs' claims should

be treated consistently within the framework, of Rio Alqom, and in
no case should relief be given where no payments under protest
were made.
Both parties have discussed the impact of McKesson
Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 110 S.Ct.
2238 (1990).

Plaintiffs suggest that Utah provides no

predeprivation proceedings consistent with that case.
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 60-62.)

(See

This ignores the

declaratory judgment statute and administrative rule to request
declaratory judgments before the Tax Commission.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46b-21 (1) (1989); see also Utah Admin. R861-1-5A

-15-

(Q).6

Plaintiffs' claim also ignores the alternative of not

paying the tax and being subject to a subsequent audit. Many
federal retirees chose the latter alternative.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 59-1-501 through 505.
It is Defendants' position that McKesson does not
dispose of the present proceeding for four reasons:

(1) McKesson

involves a Commerce Clause issue; (2) Utah provides
predeprivation remedies; (3) McKesson involved a clear and
foreseeable constitutional violation, and (4) most importantly,
McKesson was a remedies, not a choice of law case.

However, the

case suggests remedies which Plaintiffs have overlooked and which
McKesson indicated would satisfy minimum federal due process
requirements.

(See Defendants' Opening Brief at 83.) 7 It is

clear from McKesson and Utah law that a number of remedies exist
that are less draconian than the full refund Plaintiffs demand.
In their argument that equity follows the law,
Plaintiffs cite a dissent at length.
S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1991).
6

See Swanson v. State, 407

While arguing that the law ought to be

Formerly R865-05A(P) (1987); A12-01-1:5(6) (1983).

7

In McKesson, the Supreme Court gave the following
examples of postdeprivation remedies that satisfy minimum federal
Due Process requirements.
1.
Full refund of tax assessed over the amount
competitors had been charged;
2.
Collection of back taxes from those parties
benefiting from lower tax rates; and
3.
A combination of tax refunds to Petitioners and
retroactive taxation of those parties taxed at a lower rate.
id.
at 2252.
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followed, Plaintiffs ignore the available statutory and
administrative procedures discussed herein.
Plaintiffs ask the Court to view this case as 34
thousand small cases.

However viewed, the impact is the same --

104 million dollars of potential refunds to a class of Plaintiffs
who never filed one administrative or judicial proceeding prior
to the Davis decision.

Had the State persisted in allowing the

state retiree exemption in a post-Davis setting, Plaintiffs'
claim of foreseeability would be more understandable.

Given the

surprise and revolutionary nature of the Davis decision, to
imperil all of the State's other taxpayers and its already leanly
budgeted programs is inequitable.
In other states with similar statutes, where liability
related to Davis has been established, more reasonable remedies
have been fashioned.

The Arizona Tax Court ruled that Arizona

federal retirees should be entitled to a refund equal to the
increment of tax which they would not have had to pay had the
preference for state employees not existed.
P.2d 1 (Ariz. Tax 1991).

Bohn v. Waddell, 807

The Arizona relief granted Plaintiffs

six cents on the dollar, and put them in a position they would
have enjoyed had the state retiree exemption not existed.
Because of Plaintiffs' generous federal pensions and
the large number of federal retirees, the refund may amount to
104 million dollars; whereas, the cost to the state for the state
retirees preference for 1985-1988 was 8.3 million dollars.
-17-

(R.

725, 1059.)

Clearly Plaintiffs' demand under the facts is

excessive.
The Utah Legislature has twice had the opportunity to
ratify Plaintiffs' view of this case and order refunds.

The

first opportunity was when the retirement law was amended in
September 1989.

Retirement Exemption Elimination Act, 1989 Utah

Laws ch. 7 §§ 1-4.

The second opportunity was in February 199 0

when the filing period for 1985 claims was extended.
Amendments Act, 1990 Utah Laws ch. 21 §§ 1-4.

Tax Filing

Both times, the

Legislature chose not to grant Plaintiffs' requests.

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CLASS DEFINITION IS OVERBROAD.
A.

The Remedy Procedure for Taxes Deemed Illegal is
Payment Under Protest and Filing Suit in District
Court. Only a Few Members of Plaintiffs' Class
Have Followed This Procedure.

To receive a refund of allegedly illegal taxes, an
individual Plaintiff must have first paid these taxes under
protest and then filed an action in District Court.
Code Ann. § 59-1-301.

See Utah

Defendants concede that the District Court

has jurisdiction for any Plaintiff meeting this requirement.
six month statute of limitations applies.
12-31 (1987).

A

Utah Code Ann. § 78-

Anyone who has not complied with this statutory

requirement cannot be included within the class.

The class as

defined includes the years 1985-1988.

However, there

-18-

(R. 281.)

is nothing in the record showing payment under protest for years
1985-1987.
1.

There Can Be No "Overpayment" Without
Retroactive Application of Davis,

Plaintiffs argue for tax refunds under an "overpayment"
theory.

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-529(1-6).

There is a three

year limitations period for actions brought under this statute.
However, Plaintiffs' analysis begs the fundamental question:
What is the meaning of "overpayment," and what is the proper
forum for "overpayment" claims?
At the time these taxes were paid, there was no
overpayment.

The application of the Utah tax exemption to

federal retirees went unchallenged for at least 40 years. When
Plaintiffs calculated, filed, and paid their taxes there was no
"overpayment."
decision.

All taxes were proper prior to the Davis

Consequently, this Court should determine that

"overpayment" never occurred for tax years prior to the date of
that decision.
Plaintiffs' argument is that Utah has incorporated the
federal definition of "overpayment," and it includes illegal
taxes.

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 47.)

In support of this,

Plaintiffs argue that the federal government has repealed its
payment under protest requirement for illegal taxes.

(Id., at

45. )
In contrast, Utah has two separate statutes to the
-19-

federal government's single "overpayment" provision.
governs "overpayments."

One statute

The procedure under this statute is to

seek relief by filing a refund claim with the Utah State Tax
Commission.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-531(1).

The second statute

specifically governs where taxes are alleged to be illegal. Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-301. The procedure under this statute is to
seek a remedy in the District Court by paying the tax under
protest and then bringing suit.

There is no need to incorporate

the specific "illegal tax" provision into the more general
overpayment statute as the federal government has done.

The

federal government has done this because the federal illegal tax
provision has been repealed.

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 45.)

The Utah Income Tax Act requires Utah "to conform, to
the extent practicable, certain of the existing rules of
procedure . . . to corresponding or apposite rules of
administration and procedure prescribed by the federal income tax
laws . . . ."
added).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102(4) (1987) (emphasis

Definitions are the same as those under federal law

"unless a different meaning is clearly required . . . ." Utah
Code Ann. § 59-10-103(2) (1987 and Supp. 1991).

Plaintiffs

concede that there is no "corresponding or apposite" federal
rules of procedure allowing a party to elect a remedy depending
on the nature of the tax.

Accordingly, the federal definition of

"overpayment," which includes alleged illegal taxes, cannot be
incorporated into the Utah "overpayment" statute.
-20-

Utah has a specific remedial provision for alleged
illegal taxes.

Because that provision is on point, the broad

federal definition of "overpayment" does not apply.

Therefore,

the Court must apply § 59-1-301 as a procedural bar to any
Plaintiffs who have not paid tax under protest and filed suit
within six months in the District Court.

The District Court

improperly included in the class definition claims for tax years
1985-1987.

There is no evidence showing that any Plaintiff paid

under protest for those years.

Hence, the District Court had no

jurisdiction over those claims.
2.

It should be reversed.

Plaintiffs' Argument That Payment Under
Protest Was Repealed More Than Sixty Years
Ago Ignores the Wright Decision Made Twelve
Years Ago By This Court.

Plaintiffs argue: M[w]ith its incorporation of federal
tax law and procedure, Utah has adopted a system which rejected a
protest requirement for income taxes more than sixty years ago."
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 45 (footnote and emphasis
omitted). )
Plaintiffs ignore Utah law.

In Tax Comm'n v. Wright,

596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979), a taxpayer sought to test the legality
of different income tax rates for married and single persons.
Id.

The Court found that:
'[I]t is not for the tax commission to
determine questions of legality or
constitutionality of legislative enactments.'
Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 120 P.2d 274
(1941). These questions could, however, have
been raised by an independent action in a
-21-

district court pursuant to Sections 59-11-10
or 59-11-11 [Present 59-1-301 (payment under
protest)].
Id. at 636 (footnote omitted),8

Thus, for Plaintiffs to argue

that Section 59-1-301 was repealed over sixty years ago is
contrary to Wright.
3.

Section 59-10-529 Is An Administrative
Remedy. It is Unavailable in the District
Court.

Plaintiffs fail to understand that the remedy set forth
in § 59-10-529 is an administrative remedy.
it to expand the size of the class.

They attempt to use

Plaintiffs rely on Pacific

Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 316 P.2d 549
(1957).

(See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 49-53.)

In Pacific

Intermountain, the taxpayer contested the validity of a sales tax
and sought redress in the district court.
based on statutory interpretation.

Id.. His challenge was

Id., at 550. The challenge

was not one of illegality or unconstitutionality of tax laws.

He

argued that the District Court had jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-11-11, (1953) [§ 59-1-301].

However, the Tax

Commission claimed it had administrative jurisdiction under the
sales tax act.

The issue before the Court was procedural: "Can

an action to recover sales tax be maintained in the district
court?"

Id_. at 550.
The Court concluded that there was a conflict between

8

For the history of present 59-1-301 see Defendants'
Opening Brief at 22 n.l.
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the statutes argued by the parties.

It said:

Sec, 59-11-11 [present § 59-1-301] is of
ancient origin. It has existed in our law
since statehood, and sets out the historical
method of contesting payment of taxes. It is
general in its terms; has usually been
applied to disputes over property taxes and
is found in the "miscellaneous" provisions of
the tax code. On the other hand, Sees. 5915-12 to 15, upon which the Tax Commission
relies, are of more recent origin, being part
of the Sales Tax Act itself, which was
enacted in 1933; and are explicit as to the
manner in which a taxpayer dissatisfied with
a sales tax assessment may challenge it.
Id., at 551 (footnotes omitted).

The Court found that only by

electing an administrative remedy could the statutory
interpretation of the Tax Commission be challenged.

Id., at 551.

The Court refused to allow the taxpayer to use the administrative
remedy in the District Court.

Id.

Pursuant to the analysis of Pacific Intermountain,
relief under § 59-10-529 is only available in the administrative
setting.

Plaintiffs below sought relief in District Court.

This

Court cannot accept Plaintiffs' reading of Pacific Intermountain.
It must conclude that Plaintiffs have elected to proceed in
District Court and cannot expand the class definition with a
purely administrative remedy that is unavailable in that forum.
Only Plaintiffs paying their taxes under protest and bringing
suit in District Court within six months can properly challenge
the legality or constitutionality of the exemption.
This is made clear by the election of remedies
-23-

provision found in § 59-10-531 (1987):
(1) Any taxpayer claiming to be entitled to
a refund or credit under the provisions of §
59-10-529 ["overpayment" statute! may file a
claim for the refund or credit with the
commission within the time provided in that
section*
(2) No claim may be filed for refund or
credit on any tax for which the taxpayer has
sought judicial review.
(Empha sis added.)
As subsection (1) makes clear, this statute, § 59-10531, applies to the "overpayment" provision of § 59-10-529.
Subsection (2) provides that no refund or credit is available
under § 59-10-529 ("overpayment") if a taxpayer has sought
judicial review by electing to proceed in District Court. This
statute restricts the District Court from exercising jurisdiction
over a taxpayer seeking relief from an "over-payment."

Utah

District Courts have jurisdiction over all matters except as
limited by the Constitution or statute.

See Utah Const. Art.

VIII § 5 (1991); see also State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1039
(Utah 1941).

The Tax Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over

income tax matters except in a limited number of circumstances.
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544 (1987) ("[T]he commission shall
administer and enforce the tax" imposed in the Individual Income
Tax Act.)

Only one of those exceptions applies in this case —

Plaintiffs paying taxes under protest and bringing suit in

-24-

District Court for tax year 1988.9
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Utah State
Legislature specifically provided for a three year limitations
period when it adopted House Bill 373 in February of 1990. They
contend that this bill "had the express purpose of extending the
three year limit for claims under § 59-10-529(7) . . . ."
(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 44.)
This contention is flawed for two reasons.

First, it

fails to recognize § 59-10-529 as the administrative remedy.

The

argument assumes as its basic premise that § 59-10-529 applies in
District Court.

Second, it ignores the expressed legislative

declaration of purpose: "This act addresses only questions of
access to the refund adjudication process caused by the timing of
the Davis v. Michigan decision.

It does not affect the merits of

any pending or future refund litigation."
§ 2 (emphasis added).

1990 Utah Laws ch. 21

This legislation granted Plaintiffs the

opportunity to have their claims for 19 85 examined at the Tax
Commission in spite of the twenty day window between the
announcement of Davis and the filing date.

The legislature made

no statement about whether Plaintiffs' claim for refund of an
allegedly illegal tax is barred by a six month statute of
limitations.

The Legislature made no promises about the outcome

of the action and expressly reserved all defenses.
9

See infra pp. 29-31 for the three types of income tax
matters over which the District Court has jurisdiction.
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The class as defined is overbroad.

Only individuals

paying their taxes under protest and bringing an action in
District Court within six months can be included in it. The
record supports a finding that some class members paid their 1988
taxes under protest, and brought suit for refund, and are
properly before the District Court. All others must be excluded
from the class.
B«

The District Court must be reversed.

Military Retirees Were Improperly Included Within
the Class Because the Rule in Davis Does Not Apply
to Them.

As set forth in Defendants' Opening Brief at 28-30,
military retirees should not have been included within the class
definition.

This argument was supported by federal case law.

State supreme courts are split on this issue.

See Barker v.

Kansas, 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991) (federal military retirees are
denied refunds in Davis litigation).

Contra Kuhn v. Dept. of

Revenue, 817 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1991); Pledger v. Bosnick, 811
S.W.2d 286 (Ark. 1991).
U.S. Supreme Court.

This issue is now pending before the

Barker v. Kansas, 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991),

cert, granted, 112 S.Ct. 576 (1991).
Plaintiffs have made no effort to distinguish the
rationale that underlies the federal cases cited in Defendants'
Opening Brief.

Instead, they claim "[i]t is clear Congress, in

passing the USFSPA [Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection
Act], viewed military retirement pay as exactly that, retirement
pay, and not reduced pay for reduced services."
-26-

(Plaintiffs'

Opening Brief at 89.)

However, they fail to provide any

legislative history in support of this assertion.

Nor do they

cite case law supporting clear congressional intent.
Plaintiffs argue that USFSPA overrules the proposition
that military pay is reduced pay for reduced services. However,
§ 1408(c)(1) (1983) provides:
A court may treat disposable retired or
retainer pay payable to a member for pay
periods beginning after January 25, 1991,
either as property solely of the member or as
property of the member and his spouse in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction
of such court.
This supports a finding that this statute allows a state the
opportunity to decide how it will treat marital assets in a
divorce proceeding.

It fails to state how military benefits

should be treated outside of divorce proceedings.

This Court

should consider the case law and reasoning presented in
Defendants' Opening Brief.

It establishes that military retirees

receive reduced pay for reduced services.

Consequently, the

Davis decision does not apply to them as no comparable class of
retirees from the State of Utah received reduced pay for reduced
services.

The District Court's inclusion of military retirees in

the class definition should be reversed.
C.

The Class Definition is Overbroad Because
Plaintiffs Have Admitted They Can Not Prevail
Under Any Theory For the 1984 Year.

Plaintiffs argue: "[t]hough initially included in the
class, 1984 taxpayers have no valid claim to a refund and were
-27-

excluded from the final class definition."
Brief at 84.)

(Plaintiffs' Opening

They cite to the final order.

However, the

portion of the order referenced is the statement of facts. This
fails to redefine the class.

Consequently, the order defining

the class should be reversed.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
A.

The District Court Erred in Determining that the
Tax Commission had Rendered a Final Decision When
Only the Auditing Division had Examined the Issues
Raised in Davis.

Defendants moved to dismiss arguing that Plaintiffs had
not exhausted administrative remedies.

This request was denied.

Plaintiffs contend that the Commission's position on granting
refunds was clear.

(See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 66, 76.)

However, the Utah Individual Income Tax Act Provides:
The commission's action on a claim for refund
is final 90 days after the date of mailing of
the commission's notice of agency action for
taxpayers within the state, or 150 days after
the mailing of the commission's notice of
agency action for taxpayers outside the
states of the union and the District of
Columbia, unless the taxpayer files a
petition for redetermination of the action
with the commission before the expiration of
those periods.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-532 (1987) (emphasis added).
Consequently, the Commission's action could not be final because
taxpayers had actions pending before it.
-28-

There could be no final

determination of the applicability of Davis prior to final agency
action by the Commission.
B.

Declaratory Judgment is a Remedy, Not a Grant of
Jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs argue that the District Court had
jurisdiction under the declaratory judgment statute,
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 67-70.)

(See

They contend that

Defendants' reasoning that Declaratory Judgment is not
jurisdictional is "circuitous."

(Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 68

n.38. )
This Court in Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148
(Utah 1983) (emphasis added) reasoned:
The statutory creation of relief in the form
of a declaratory judgment does not create a
cause of action or grant jurisdiction to the
court where it would not otherwise exist,
the Utah Declaratory Judgment Statute merely
authorizes a new form of relief, which in
some cases will provide a fuller and more
adequate remedy than that which existed under
the common law. Gray v. Defaf 103 Utah 339,
135 P.2d 251 (1943) .
Accordingly, the District Court's independent basis for
jurisdiction was for 1988 only.
C.

Before the District Court Could Rule that
Plaintiffs Need Not Exhaust Administrative
Remedies, It Must Have Had Jurisdiction to Hear
the Case.

The Utah Constitution gives the Tax Commission
authority to supervise and administer the tax laws of the state.
See Utah Const. Art. XIII § 11. The Utah Supreme Court has also
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found: "The [tax] commission has general supervision over the tax
laws of the state . . . ."

Board of Equalization of Kane County

v. Tax Comm'n, 50 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1935); see also Baker v.
Tax Comm'n, 520 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1974) (plurality opinion
cites Board of Equalization of Kane County v. Tax Comm'n with
approval).

The Legislature has also granted identical

supervisory and administrative authority to the Tax Commission.
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(5) (1987).

Utah District Courts

have jurisdiction "except as limited by [the] constitution or by
statute . . . ."

Utah Const. Art. VIII § 5 (1991).

Supreme Court has declared:

The Utah

"[T]he legislature may define and

prescribe the forum in which actions may or must be commenced . .
. ."

State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Utah 1941).

Accordingly, the Legislature properly granted jurisdiction to the
Tax Commission over income tax matters.
The Utah State Individual Income Tax Act provides:
"The commission shall administer and enforce the tax herein
imposed . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544 (1987).

Consequently, the Legislature has granted jurisdiction to the
State Tax Commission to administer and enforce all laws dealing
with state income tax.
The District Court has jurisdiction over only three
types of income tax cases:
1.

Petitions for Writ of Mandate may be brought in

District Court to compel a taxpayer to file individual income tax
-30-

returns.

Utah Code Ann- § 59-1-707 (1987).
2.

The Tax Division of the District Court has

appellate jurisdiction over Tax Commission decisions rendered in
informal proceedings.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(1)(b) (1987).

District Court has jurisdiction for taxes alleged

to be illegal and paid under protest.10

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-

301 (1987).
None of these jurisdictional provisions are applicable
in this case except for 1988 taxes paid under protest.
Consequently, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
refund claims brought under the "overpayment" statute.
D.

The District Court Could Not Have Issued a Writ of
Mandamus Requiring Plaintiffs to Act Where an
Injunction was in Place Barring Them from Acting.

Plaintiffs argue that the District Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to a petition for writ of mandamus.

(See

Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 70.) A writ of mandamus does not
grant the court jurisdiction where it does not exist. Cf.
Terracor v. Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986)
(Mandamus cannot issue if a party lacks standing.)
There is nothing in the record showing Plaintiffs ever

10

Where a party challenges the legality or the
constitutionality of a statute, the exclusive remedy is "payment
under protest in compliance with" statutory procedures. See Shea
v. Tax Comm'n, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1941).
Unless these
procedures are followed, the taxpayer must seek an administrative
remedy and seek review by the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1991 & 1987).
-31-

petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus.

However, even if

they had petitioned for mandamus, it is unjustified in this case.
A writ of mandamus is only appropriate where an
inferior tribunal has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion."
1988).

Dorge v. Court of Appeals, 762 P.2d 347 (Utah

The Commission did neither.

First, it was enjoined by

the District Court prior to ever being able to act.

(R. 267.)

The general rule is:
Since the appropriate function of mandamus is
to compel the performance of duties imposed
upon the respondent by law, and not to coerce
acts which the law prohibits, it would seem
that the relief ought not to be granted to
enforce the doing of an act which has been
expressly forbidden by injunction . . .
State v. Shipton, 286 P.2d 601, 602 (Wyo. 1955) (Quoting, 34
Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 77).
Second, it cannot be argued that the Commission abused
its discretion where there was no clear legal requirement for
issuing tax refunds.

In order to issue a writ of mandamus, the

law must not only authorize the demanded action but require it;
and the duty must be clear and undisputable.
377 P.2d 302 (Wyo. 1963).
issue refunds.

LeBeau v. State,

There was no clear requirement to

Consequently, the District Court was without

jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus.
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POINT V
FEES AND COSTS WERE INCORRECTLY AWARDED.
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to fees and a
costs under two theories.

Their first theory is that damages are

proper under a § 1983 civil rights claim.

That claim was

dismissed and the correctness of that decision is addressed at
Point VI.

Second, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court issued a

writ of mandamus, and as a result of that order costs and
attorneys fees are properly assessed.
is no basis for mandamus.

As discussed above, there

Therefore, fees and costs were

improperly awarded.
POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING
THE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIM.
Introduction
In reviewing a dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 12
(b)(6), this Court accepts the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and considers all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194
(Utah 1991).

A motion to dismiss is appropriate where it is

clear that the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under
the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to
support their claim.

Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d

622, 624 (Utah 1990) .
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The District Court was correct in dismissing
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim.

Plaintiffs' allegations of illegal

exaction and retention of taxes are legal conclusions, not facts.
A cause of action under § 1983 is viable only if the Defendants'
reliance on existing law was unreasonable and violated clearly
established statutory or Constitutional rights.

Because right to

refunds for any year had been established at the time Plaintiffs'
brought their claims, Defendants' actions were not in violation
of "a clearly established right of which a reasonable person
would have known."

Thus, a viable § 1983 claim cannot be

supported.
The State and the Tax Commission are not "persons"
under the language of § 1983 and therefore are not subject to a §
1983 claim for damages in state court.
Plaintiffs' allegations of individual liability against
the Tax Commissioners and the Commission Director are really
official capacity claims. All allegations of wrongdoing here are
related to each Defendant's office because Plaintiffs claim they
reasonably relied on the public statements of individual Tax
Commission members.

There is no claim that the State officials

acted for their own benefit outside their official capacities.
Even if this is an individual capacity claim, the
individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants' conduct did not violate clearly established rights.
A right to refunds was not clearly established at the time.
-34-

Thus, Defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to
qualified immunity-

The District Court correctly dismissed the §

1983 claim on immunity grounds.
A.

Plaintiffs' Allegations Fail to Support a § 1983
Claim on Which Relief can be Granted.

Plaintiffs' complaint attempts to characterize as
"factual allegations" what really are Plaintiffs' legal
conclusions.

Plaintiffs allegations of illegal exaction and

retention of taxes are legal conclusions, not facts. At the time
the complaint was filed, no clear right to refunds existed.

It

is axiomatic that where no clear right existed, Defendants could
not have knowingly violated such a right.

Thus, no viable § 19 8 3

cause of action exists.
Plaintiffs assert their § 1983 claim based upon an
alleged violation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 111 and the U.S.
Constitution because of the preferential treatment given to state
retirees.

Utah's taxation scheme had existed for many years and

was presumptively valid.

See State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519

(Utah App. 1990); see also Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07
(Utah 1974) (Legislative enactments are presumed valid).
The statutes and rules applicable to tax assessment and
collection for tax years 1985 through 1988 were fixed on December
31st at the close of each tax year.

At the close of these tax

years, two things were clear: (1) The taxation of federal
retirees was lawful; and (2) Utah's tax statutes exempting state
-35-

retirees while taxing all others was permissible.

The State's

reliance on long established and unchallenged state law was
reasonable.

At the time the actions complained of took place,

they were lawful.
A cause of action under § 1983 is viable only if the
State's reliance on existing law was unreasonable and violated
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.11
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

The State's

actions do not provide the basis for a § 1983 claim.
B.

The State and its Agencies are Entitled to
Sovereign Immunity, and State Officials in Their
Official Capacities are Immune from Damages Under
§ 1983.

The Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, (1989), held that a state is not a
"person" under § 1983 and is not subject to a state court claim
for damages in a § 1983 action. Jld. at 63. A state is granted
sovereign immunity in its own courts. JTd.. at 69.

Thus, under

Will/ Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against the State and the State
Tax Commission was properly dismissed.
The Will Court further found that a suit against state

11

4 U.S.C. § 111 creates no enforceable rights under § 1983
because intergovernmental immunity claims are not "rights,
privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983. See
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing, 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.
Ct. 766 (1987). The statute "being grounded not on individual
rights but instead on considerations of power — will not support
an action under § 1983." Segundo v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813
F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987).
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officials in their official capacities is really a suit against
the officials' offices and is no different from a suit against
the state itself-

JEd. at 71. Accordingly, the § 1983 claim

against the Tax Commissioners and Director in their official
capacities was properly dismissed on sovereign immunity
grounds .12
Plaintiffs cite Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S.Ct. 865
(1991), which provides a § 1983 cause of action against state
taxing officials for injunctive and declaratory relief for clear
violations of the Commerce Clause,
authorize a damages remedy.

However, Dennis does not

Moreover, Dennis does not overrule

the immunity doctrines discussed above.

Dennis only provided for

a § 1983 claim for violations of the Commerce Clause.
Plaintiffs argue, in a partial quote from Justice
Kennedy's dissent (without identifying it as such), that
Plaintiffs are entitled to sue for monetary damages here under §
1983. (Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 94.)
reaching.

Dennis is not so far

The Dennis dissenters urge that the Court must

"distinguish between those constitutional provisions which secure
the rights of persons vis-a-vis the States, and those provisions
which allocate power between the Federal and State Governments.
The former secure rights within the meaning of § 1983, but the
12

Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991) recently clarified
Will. Hafer limited Will's sovereign immunity holding where state
officials are sued in their individual capacities. See Section D,
infra, for discussion of Hafer's impact.
-37-

latter do not." JEd. at 873. According to the dissenters,
intergovernmental tax immunity provided by 4 U.S.C § 111 and the
U.S. Constitution is not a right protected by § 1983; rather,
intergovernmental tax immunity is a classic example where the
provisions are only intended to allocate power between the
federal and state governments, i.e. allocation of tax authority.
In fact, the dissent states that "[T]here is no textual or other
support for holding that § 1983 imposes such far reaching

l i a b i l i t i e s upon the S t a t e s . "

JTcl. a t 879.

Even if a § 1983 cause of action were to exist here,
official capacity Defendants, under Will, are still immune from
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim for monetary damages.

The District

Court was correct in dismissing the § 1983 claim on immunity
grounds.
C.

Plaintiffs' Allegations of Individual Liability
are Really Disguised Official Capacity Claims.

Although Plaintiffs say the individual Defendants are
named in this action as individuals, the Defendants are in
reality being sued in their official capacities.

An official

capacity action is distinguished from an individual capacity
lawsuit by the substance of the claim.

Official capacity suits

involve the policy or custom of a government entity.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-167 (1985).

Kentucky v.

In official capacity

actions, the office of the individual defendant is related to the
alleged improper conduct.

Ld.

The Seventh Circuit Court of
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Appeals explained the official capacity concept as follows:
If the [plaintiff's] theory is that the
defendant occupied a given office, and the
occupant of the office had a duty (one
attaching to any occupant of the office) to
do such and such, then we have an "official
capacity" suit . . . .
If the theory is that
the defendant did something that is tortious
[sic] independent of the office the defendant
holds, we have an "individual capacity" suit.
Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1986).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs state in the Amended
Complaint that the individual Defendants are being sued as
individuals.

However, this unsupported characterization does not

dispose of the question.

The substance of the claim is

determinative, and the Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate that
the individuals are sued in their official capacities.
The Graham and Walker courts held that an official
capacity suit alleges misconduct related to a Defendant's office
and to policy issuing therefrom.
done just that.

In this case, Plaintiffs have

The Amended Complaint states that the individual

Defendants have taken an illegal position concerning the taxation
of federal pensions and have misrepresented the law on such tax.
(Amended Complaint, paragraphs 15-18, 29-32, 45-47.)

These are

official capacity acts because they involve statements of Utah
Tax Commission policy.

Moreover, the acts are related to each

Defendant's office because Plaintiffs claim they reasonably
relied on the public statements of the individual Tax Commission
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members.

(JEd. at 45-47.)

There is no allegation of an act

independent of the individuals' offices, and no claim that the
state officials acted for their own benefit outside their
official capacities.

This is an official capacity action,

therefore, and was properly dismissed under the Will holding.
D.

If This is an Individual Capacity Case, the
Individual Defendants are Entitled to Qualified
Immunity with Respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 Claim
for Monetary Damages.

Defendants do not concede that this is a proper
individual capacity case.

However, even if it is, the individual

Defendants have qualified immunity.

Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct.

358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), cited by Plaintiffs, recently
clarified the official and individual capacity dichotomy.

Hafer

was a "capacity" case; it was not a qualified immunity case.
Hafer merely said that a defendant cannot convert a valid
individual capacity suit to an official capacity suit.

The Court

granted certiorari to "address the question whether state
officers may be held personally liable for damages under § 1983
based upon actions taken in official capacities."

JEd. at 361.

The court said:
Summarizing our holding, [in Willi we said:
"[N]either a State nor its officials acting
in their official capacities are 'persons'
under § 1983."
. . .

State officers sued for damages in their
official capacity are not "persons" for
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purposes of the suit because they assume the
identity of the government that employs them.
Ibid, By contrast, officers sued in their
personal capacity come to court as
individuals. A government official in the
role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits
comfortably within the statutory term
"person."
Id. at 362. Although state officers in their individual
capacities are subject to a § 1983 monetary relief claim, the
Court made clear that qualified personal immunity may still
attach to those individuals:
While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity
suit need not establish a connection to
governmental "policy or custom," officials
sued in their personal capacities, unlike
those sued in their official capacities, may
assert personal immunity defenses such as
objectively reasonable reliance on existing
law.
Id. at 362, (citation omitted, emphasis added).
Government officials who reasonably rely on existing
law while performing discretionary functions are immune if their
conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

"A

plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or
statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified
immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly
established at the time of the conduct at issue."

Davis v.

Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1226
(1984) .
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The Supreme Court recently elaborated on the Harlow
standard and made it clear that not only the right but also the
unlawfulness of the official's conduct in light of that right
must be clearly established to overcome qualified immunity.
The contours of the right [allegedly
violated] must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right. This
is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the
very action in question has previously been
held unlawful . . . but it is to say that in
the light of the preexisting law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citations
omitted).

Reasonable grounds existed for Defendants' actions.

The plain language of 4 U.S.C. § 111 was not such that tax
officials would have known that Utah's disparate tax treatment of
state and federal pensions violated the law.

Even the Justices

of the Supreme Court could not agree that the right defined in
Davis was clearly established before Davis.

It would be

inappropriate to expect the individual Defendants to have such
discernment.

Further, because Davis did not mandate refunds,

Defendants failure to sua sponte issue refunds after March 28,
1989 cannot be characterized as action "that had previously been
held unlawful."

JEd. Many state court decisions on the Davis

issue have different outcomes.

Tax refund claims based upon

retroactive application of Davis are not a clearly established
right.

Accordingly, the individual Defendants have qualified
-42-

immunity.
Faced with similar facts and the same question
presented here, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Swanson v.
Powers, 937 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 60 U.S.L.W.
3475 (January 13, 1992), held that because the law was not
clearly established when Davis was decided, the State Revenue
Secretary was entitled to qualified immunity from suit under §
1983 for pre and post-Davis actions.

I(i. at 966.

The court

reasoned that although public officials are "charged with
knowledge of constitutional developments, [they] are not required
to predict the future course of constitutional law."

Id,, at 968

(quoting Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Powers' good faith adherence to the state's procedural statutes
regarding refunds, and reliance on the advice of North Carolina's
Attorney General entitled her to immunity for pre and post-Davis
tax collection.

jrd. at 971-973.

(See also Duffy v. Wetzler, No.

90-07800 (N.Y. App. Div., January 15, 1992) (qualified immunity
provided a basis for rejecting § 1983 claims); see also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 207-09 (1973) (except under extraordinary
circumstances, liability will not attach for executing the
statutory duties one was appointed to perform).
The individual Defendants in this case are likewise
entitled to qualified immunity from liability for pre and postDavis actions.

Like the Defendants in Swanson and Dufjfy, the Tax

Commissioners and Director reasonably relied upon existing law.
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The outcome of Davis was not clearly foreshadowed, and the issue
of refunds was not addressed by the Davis Court. Plaintiffs'
asserted right to refunds was not clearly established at the time
they filed their complaint.

Thus, the Defendants' conduct did

not contravene clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights.

The Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and

the District Court's dismissal of § 1983 claims should be upheld.
E.

Dismissal of § 1983 Claims Should be Sustained Due
to Plaintiffs' Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies.

Plaintiffs' refusal to allow the Commission to
adjudicate refund claims and possibly afford the relief sought by
some Plaintiffs under § 59-10-529 should preclude the § 1983
claims in District Court.

Plaintiffs who were successful in

enjoining the State from proceeding administratively with refund
claims should not be allowed to shortcut exhaustion requirements
and thereafter prosecute a § 1983 claim, which is essentially a
refund claim under another name, against those whom they have
enjoined.
The Oregon Supreme Court in its post-Davis decision,
Nutbrown v. Munn, 811 P.2d 131 (Or. 1991) cert, denied, 112 S.Ct.
867 (1992), held that § 1983 claims against state tax officials
in their individual capacities were properly dismissed based on
the taxpayers' failure to exhaust state administrative remedies.
Id. at 143.

The court rejected taxpayers' argument that
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administrative remedies were inadequate and futile.

The court

said:
If Taxpayers exhaust their administrative
remedies and, in the process, obtain the
relief under the Oregon personal income tax
laws that they seek, the need for this § 19 83
litigation vanishes. That is a sufficient
reason to require exhaustion.
Id., at 142-143 (footnote omitted).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently addressed this
same issue. In Hogan v. Musolf, 471 N.W.2d 216, 217 (Wis. 1991),
cert, denied, 112 S.Ct. 867 (1992) the court held that taxpayers
were required to exhaust administrative remedies before
commencing a § 1983 action, and noted that its holding was
consistent with other states' views.

The court said:

[T]he retirees' inability to obtain damages
from the defendants in their individual
capacities does not make the exhaustion
requirement futile. The damages claimed
against the defendants in their individual
capacities are essentially a refund claim
under a different name. The state's refund
procedure adequately addresses these claims.
Until that remedy is exhausted, "damages" are
irrelevant. The defendants should, as
McNary, 454 U.S. at 114, 102 S.Ct. at 185,
suggests, be permitted to "rectify any
alleged impropriety" through the state's
procedure.
Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
Here, as in Oregon and Wisconsin, Plaintiffs sought to
avoid administrative procedures.

In this case, Plaintiffs were

successful in enjoining the Defendants from making determinations
on claims for refund.

(R. 367.)

Yet, Plaintiffs' claim for §
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1983 damages is essentially a refund claim under another name.13
The Defendants should be permitted to rectify any alleged
impropriety before suffering a § 1983 state court action.
Therefore, consistent with the Nutbrown and Hogan reasoning,
Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies supports
dismissal of their § 1983 claim.

RELIEF REQUESTED
This Court should enter an order as follows:
1.

The Class should be redefined to include only

Plaintiffs who have followed the procedures of Utah Code Ann. §
59-1-301 (1987).

It is the remedy for alleged illegal taxes.

Only those Plaintiffs making payment of taxes under protest and
suing in District Court within six months are properly before the

13

But for the injunction, Defendants would have adjudicated
the refund claims.
In their "quasi-judicial" capacity, the
individual Defendants would have been absolutely immune from § 1983
damages liability. The Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 514 (1978) granted absolute immunity to officials performing
adjudicatory functions within an agency. While qualified immunity
from liability for damages is the general rule applicable to
executive department officials, there are certain functions
perfprmed by such officials that require complete, absolute
immunity.
Administrative adjudication shares enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process that participants are given
absolute immunity from suits for damages. Jd. at 513. (See also,
Horwitz v. Board of Medical Examiners of State of Colorado, 822
F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987)
(Absolute immunity which affords complete protection from liability
for damages, defeats suit at outset.)
Plaintiffs should not be
allowed to circumvent well founded judicial policy affording
Defendants absolute immunity because they succeeded in enjoining
Defendants from adjudicating refund claims.
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District Court.

The record supports a finding that some

Plaintiffs paid their 1988 taxes under protest and brought suit
within the prescribed time.

The class should be limited to those

persons.
2.

The rule in Davis does not apply to federal

military retirees.

Because military retirement pay is current

compensation, it is fundamentally different from the pensions
which were exempt from Utah income tax.

There was no comparable

class of state retirees who received current pay for reduced
services.

They should be excluded from the class definition.
3.

remedy.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-529 is an administrative

It is not applicable in this case.

It is unavailable in

the District Court.
4.
case.

The Chevron retroactivity doctrine governs this

Davis is a new rule of law; therefore, pursuant to

American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2336 (1990)
(Plurality Opinion), "prospective application of a new rule of
law begins on the date of the decision announcing the principle."
That date is March 28, 1989.

Because tax liability for 1988 was

fixed on December 31, 1988, the rule in Davis does not apply to
the 1988 tax year or prior years.

The Legislature made the Davis

rule fully operative for tax year 1989.
5.

The District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs'

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Plaintiffs' Complaint attempted to

characterize as factual allegations what in reality were legal
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conclusions.

No right to income tax refunds existed.

The Tax

Commission, the State, and Tax Commission Officers are entitled
to sovereign immunity in their official capacities and to
qualified immunity in their individual capacities.
6.

Fees and costs were incorrectly awarded.

Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim was properly dismissed.
1983 provides no basis for fees and costs.

First,

Consequently §

Second, Plaintiffs

failed to petition the District Court for a writ of mandamus.
Even if they had petitioned for the writ, it would be improper in
this case.

Consequently, the awarding of fees and costs was

improper.
If this Court determines that the rule of law in Davis
applies for tax years 1985-1988, it should reverse the remedy
crafted by the District Court.

This Court should weigh heavily

the benefit that State retirees received prior to Davis.

State

retirees received 8.3 million dollars in tax exemptions for tax
years 1985-1988. Any relief granted Plaintiffs should be based
on this amount received by state retirees for the same period.

OtA/
Respectfully submitted this } ' day of March, 1992.
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APPENDIX 1

JAMKS H. IlKAM DISTi LLING CO. v. GEORGIA
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than report without them? Third, the
Court suggests that misquotations that do
not materially alter the meaning inflict no
injury to reputation that is compensable as
defamation. Ante, at 2433. This may be
true, but this is a question of defamation or
not, and has nothing to do with whether
the author deliberately put within quotation marks and attributed to the speaker
words that the author knew the speaker
did not utter.
As I see it, the defendants' motion for
summary judgment based on lack of malice
should not have been granted on any of the
six quotations considered by the Court in
Part III-B of its opinion. I therefore dissent from the result reached with respect
to the "It Sounded Better" quotation dealt
with in paragraph (c) of Part i l l - B , but
agree with the Court's judgment on the
other five misquotations.

be applied prospectively, and distiller appealed. The Georgia Supreme Court, 259
Ga. 3o3, 382 S.E.2d Mt affirmed, and distiller petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme
Court, Justice Souter, held that prior ruling
invalidating similar Hawaii tax scheme a|>plied retroactively to present claim arising
out of facts antedating that decision.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice White filed decision concurring
in judgment.
Justice Blackmun filed opinion concurring in judgment, in which Justices Marshall and Scalia joined.
Justice Scalia filed opinion concurring
in judgment in which Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joined.
Justice O'Connor filed dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy joined.
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JAMKS B. BEAM DISTILLING
COMPANY, Petitioner
v.
GEORGIA et al.
No. 89-680.
Argued Oct. 30, 191)0.
Decided June 20, 1<J*J1.

Distiller brought action to recover $2.4
million in excise taxes that had been paid
under Georgia excise tax statute that imposed greater tax on imported alcoholic
beverages than was imposed on liquor manufactured from Georgia-grown products.
The Fulton Superior Court, Ralph H. Hicks,
J., determined that statute violated commerce clause but that its ruling would only
•The syllabus constitutes no pan ol ihe opinion
of the Court but has been prcpatcd by the He

1. Courts <e=>100(l)
When Supreme Court has applied rule
of law to litigants in one case it must do 80
with respect to all others not barred by
procedural requirements or res judicata.
(Per Souter, J., with one Justice concurring
and four Justices concurring in judgment.)
2. Court* G=> 100(1)

Supreme Court's decision in Bacchus
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, that Hawaii statute
imposing greater excise tax on imported
alcoholic products than was imposed on
local alcoholic products violated commerce
clause, applied retroactively to similar
Georgia excise tax statute being challenged
in action arising out of facts antedating
that decision. (Per Souter, J., with one
Justice concurring and four Justices concurring in judgment.) O.C.G.A. § 3-4-60;
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
Syllabus
Before 1985, Georgia law imposed an
excise tax on imj>orted liquor at a rate
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader. Sec Untied Stales v. ItetroU Lumber Co..
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double that imposed on liquor manufactured from Georgia-grown products. In
1984, this Court, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd.
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82
L.Ed.2d 200, held that a similar Hawaii law
violated the Commerce Clause. Petitioner,
a manufacturer of Kentucky Bourbon,
thereafter filed an action in Georgia state
court, seeking a refund of taxes it paid
under Georgia's law for 1982, 1983, and
1984. The court declared the statute unconstitutional, but refused to apply its ruling retroactively, relying on Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30
L.Ed.2d 296, which held that a decision will
be applied prospectively where it displaces
a principle of law on which reliance may
reasonably have been placed, and where
prospectivity is on balance warranted by its
effect on the operation of the new rule and
by the inequities that might otherwise result from retroactive application.
The
State Supreme Court affirmed.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and
the case is remanded.
259 Ga. 363, 382 S.E.2d 95 (Ga.1989),
reversed and remanded.
Justice SOUTER, joined by Justice
STEVENS, concluded that once this Court
has applied a rule of law to the litigants in
one case, it must do so with respect to all
others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata. Pp. 2442-2448.
(a) Whether a new rule should apply
retroactively is in the first instance a matter of choice of law, to which question
there are three possible answers. The first
and normal practice is to make a decision
fully retroactive. Second, there is the
purely prospective method of overruling,
where the particular case is decided under
the old law but announces the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring
after the date of that decision. Finally, the
new rule could be applied in the case in
which it is pronounced, but then return to
the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement.
The possibility of such modified, or selec200 VS. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282. 287. 50 L.Ed.

tive, prospectivity was abandoned in the
criminal context in Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93
L.Ed.2d 649. Pp. 2442-2445.
(b) Because Bacchus did not reserve
the question, and remanded the case for
consideration of remedial issues, it is properly understood to have followed the normal practice of applying its rule retroactively to the litigants there before the
Court. Pp. 2445-2446.
(c) Because Bacchus thus applied its
own rule, principles of equality and stare
decisis require that it be applied to the
litigants in this case. Griffith's equality
principle, that similarly situated litigants
should be treated the same, applies equally
well in the civil context as in the criminal.
Of course, retroactivity is limited by the
need for finality, since equality for those
whose claims have been adjudicated could
only be purchased at the expense of the
principle that there be an end of litigation.
In contrast, parties, such as petitioner, who
wait to litigate until after others have labored to create a new rule, are merely
asserting a right that is theirs in law, is not
being applied on a prospective basis only,
and is not otherwise barred by state procedural requirements. Modified prospectivity rejected, a new rule may not be retroactively applied to some litigants when it is
not applied to others. This necessarily limits the application of the Chevron Oil test,
to the effect that it may not distinguish
between litigants for choice-of-law purposes on the particular equities of their
claims to prospectivity. It is the nature of
precedent that the substantive law will not
shift and spring on such a basis. Pp. 24462447.
(d) This opinion does not speculate as
to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity. Nor does it determine the appropriate remedy in this case, since remedial
issues were neither considered below nor
argued to this Court. P. 2448.
499.
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Justice WHITE concluded that, under
any one of several suppositions, the opinion
in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 408 U.S.
263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200, may
reasonably read to extend the benefits of
the judgment in that case to Bacchus Imports and that petitioner here should also
have the benefit of Bacchus.
If the Court
in Bacchus thought that its decision was
not a new rule, there would be no doubt
that it would be retroactive to all similarly
situated litigants. The Court in that case
may also have thought that retroactivity
was proper under the factors set forth in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92
S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296. And, even if the
Court was wrong in applying Bacchus
retroactively, there is no precedent in civil
cases for applying a new rule to the parties
of the case but not to others. Moreover,
Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328,
107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, has
overruled such a practice in criminal cases
and should be followed on the basis of
stare decisis.
However, the propriety of
pure prospectivity is settled in this Court's
prior cases, see, e.g., Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897,
1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647, which recognize that
in proper cases a new rule announced by
the Court will not be applied retroactively,
even to the parties before the Court. To
allow for the possibility of speculation as to
the propriety of such prospectivity is to
suggest that there may come a time when
this Court's precedents on the issue will be
overturned. Pp. 2448-2449.
Justice BLACKMUN, joined by Justice
MARSHALL and Justice SCALJA, concluded that prospectivity, whether "selective"
or "pure," breaches the Court's obligation
to discharge its constitutional function in
articulating new rules for decision, which
must comport with its duty to decide only
cases and controversies. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93
L.Ed.2d 649. The nature of judicial review
constrains the Court to require retroactive
application of each new rule announced.
Pp. 2449-2450.
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Justice SCALIA, joined by Justice
MARSHALL and Justice BLACKMUN,
while agreeing with Justice SOUTER's conclusion, disagreed that the issue is one of
choice of law, and concluded that both selective and pure prospectivity are impermissible, not for reasons of equity, but because they are not permitted by the Constitution. To allow the Judiciary powers
greater than those conferred by the Constitution, as the fundamental nature of those
powers was understood when the Constitution was enacted, would upset the division
of federal powers central to the constitutional scheme. Pp. 2450-2451.
SOUTER, J., announced the
judgment of the Court, and delivered an
opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined.
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment BLACKMUN, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which MARSHALL and SCALIA, JJ.,
joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which
MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which
REHNQU1ST, C.J., and KENNEDY, J.,
joined.

Morton Siegel, Chicago, III., for petitioner.
Amelia W. Baker, Atlanta, Ga., for respondents.
Justice SOUTER announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion
in which Justice STEVENS joins.
The question presented is whether our
ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd, v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200
(1984), should apply retroactively to claims
arising on facts antedating that decision.
We hold that application of the rule in that
case requires its application retroactively in
later cases.

m
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1
Prior to its amendment in 1985, Georgia
state law imposed an excise tax on imported alcohol and distilled spirits at a rate
double that imposed on alcohol and distilled
spirits manufactured from Georgia-grown
products. See Ga.Code Ann. § 3-4-f>0
(1982). In 1984, a Hawaii statute that similarly distinguished between imported and
local alcoholic products was held in Bacchus to violate the Commerce Clause.
Bacchus, supra, at 273, 104 S.Ct., at 3056.
It proved no bar to our finding of unconstitutionality that the discriminatory tax involved intoxicating liquors, with respect to
which the States have heightened regulatory powers under the Twenty-first Amendment. Id., at 276, 104 S.Ct., at 3057.
In Bacchus' wake, petitioner, a Delaware
corporation and Kentucky bourbon manufacturer, claimed Georgia's law likewise inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, and
sought a refund of $2.4 million, representing not only the differential taxation but
the full amount it had paid under § 3-4-60
for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Georgia's Department of Revenue failed to respond to the request, and Beam thereafter
brought a refund action against the State
in the Superior Court of Fulton County.
On cross-motions for summary judgment,
the trial court agreed that § 3-4-60 could
not withstand a Bacchus attack for the
years in question, and that the tax had
therefore been unconstitutional. Using the
analysis described in this Court's decision
in Chevron Oil Co. r. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the
court nonetheless refused to apply its ruling retroactively. It therefore denied petitioner's refund request.

tectionism." See 259 Ga. 363, 3G4, 382
S.E.2d 95, 9(i (1989) (citing Bacchus). But
it, too, applied that finding on a prospective
basis only, in the sense that it declined to
declare the State's application of the statute unconstitutional for the years in question. The court concluded that but for
Bacchus its decision on the constitutional
question would have established a new rule
of law by overruling past precedent, see
Scott v. State, 187 Ga. 702, 2 S.E.2d 65
(1939) (upholding predecessor to § 3-4-60
against Commerce Clause objection), upon
which the litigants may justifiably have
relied. See 259 Ga., at 365, 382 S.E.2d, at
96. That reliance, together with the "unjust results" that would follow from retroactive application, was thought by the
court to satisfy the Chevron Oil test for
prospectivity. To the dissenting argument
of two justices that a statute found unconstitutional is unconstitutional ab initio, the
court observed that while it had " 'declared
statutes to be void from their inception
when they were contrary to the Constitution at the time of enactment, . . . those
decisions are not applicable to the present
controversy, as the original . . . statute,
when adopted, was not violative of the Constitution under the court interpretations of
that period/ " 259 Ga., at 366, 382 S.E.2d,
at 97 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 249 Ga.
477, 478-479, 291 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1982)).
Beam sought a writ of certiorari from
the Court on the retroactivity question. 1
We granted the petition, 496 U.S.
, 110
S.Ct. 2616, 110 L.Ed.2d 637 (1990), and now
reverse.

'The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed
the trial court in both respects. The court
held the pre-1985 version of the statute to
have violated the Commerce Clause as, in
its words, an act of "simple economic pro-

II
In the ordinary case no question of retroactivity arises. Courts are as a general
matter in the business of applying settled
principles and precedents of law to the
disputes that come to bar. See Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, The Great

1. Although petitioner expends some effort, see
Brief for Petitioner 5-8. in asserting the unconstitutionality under Bacchus of the Georgia law
as amended, see Ga.Code Ann. § 3-4-60 (1990).

an argument rejected by the Georgia Supreme
Court in HeubUin, Inc. v. Slate, 256 Ga. 578, 351
S.E.2d 190 (1987). that issue is neither before us
nor relevant to the issue that is.
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Writ, and the Due Process of Time and
Law, 79 Harv.L.Iiev. 5(5, 60 (1965). Where
those principles and precedents antedate
the events on which the dispute turns, the
court merely applies legal rules already
decided, and the litigant has no basis on
which to claim exemption from those rules.
It is only when the law changes in some
respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity may be entertained, the paradigm case
arising when a court expressly overrules a
precedent upon which the contest would
otherwise be decided differently and by
which the parties may previously have regulated their conduct. Since the question is
whether the court should apply the old rule
or the new one, retroactivity is properly
seen in the first instance as a matter of
choice of law, "a choice . . . between the
principle of forward operation and that of
relation backward." Great Northern
R.
Co. v, Sunburst
Oil & Refining Co., 287
U.S. 358, 364, 53 S.Ct. 145, 148, 77 L.Ed.
360 (1932). Once a rule is found to apply
''backward," there may then be a further
issue of remedies, i.e., whether the party
prevailing under a new rule should obtain
the same relief that would have been
awarded if the rule had been an old one.
Subject to possible constitutional thresholds, see McKesson Corp. o. Florida Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Div., 496
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17
(1990), the remedial inquiry is one governed
by state law, at least where the case originates in state court. See American
Trucking Assiis., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S.
,
, 110 S.Ct. 2323,
, 110 L.Ed.2d 148
(1990) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the
antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal one where the rule at issue itself derives from federal law, constitutional or
otherwise. See Smith, supra, at
, 110
S.Ct., at
(plurality opinion); cf. United
States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286,
297, n., 90 S.Ct. 1033, 1039, n., 25 L.Ed.2d
312 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
As a matter purely of judicial mechanics,
there are three ways in which the choice-oflaw problem may be resolved. First, a

decision may be made fully retroactive, applying both to the parties before the court
and to all others by and against whom
claims may be pressed, consistent with res
judicata and procedural barriers such as
statutes of limitations. This practice is
overwhelmingly the norm, see Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372, 30
S.Ct. 140, 148, 54 L.Ed. 228 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide
cases before them based upon their best
current understanding of the law. See
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
679, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1173, 28 L.Ed.2d 404
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments
in part and dissenting in part). It also
reflects the declaratory theory of law, see
Smith, supra, at
, 110 S.Ct., at
(1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
622-623, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1733-1734, 14
L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), according to which the
courts are understood only to find the law,
not to make it. But in some circumstances
retroactive application may prompt difficulties of a practical sort. However much it
comports with our received notions of the
judicial role, the practice has been attacked
for its failure to take account of reliance on
cases subsequently abandoned, a fact of
life if not always one of jurisprudential
recognition. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow,
341 U.S. 267, 276, 71 S.Ct. 680, 684, 95
L.Ed. 927 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
Second, there is the purely prospective
method of overruling, under which a new
rule is applied neither to the parties in the
law-making decision nor to those others
against or by whom it might be applied to
conduct or events occurring before that
decision. The case is decided under the old
law but becomes a vehicle for announcing
the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring after the date of that decision. This Court has, albeit infrequently,
resorted to pure prospectivity, see Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349,
30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971); Northern
Pipeline
Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
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Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2880,
73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 142-143, 96 S.Ct. 612, 693, 46
L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S.
411, 422, 84 S.Ct. 461, 468, 11 L.Ed.2d 440
(1964); see also Smith, supra, at
, n.
11, 110 S.Ct., at 2354, n. 11 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting); Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S., at
628, 85 S.Ct., at 1737, although in so doing
it has never been required to distinguish
the remedial from the choice-of-law aspect
of its decision. See Smith, supra, at
,
110 S.Ct., at
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). This approach claims justification in
its appreciation that "[t]he past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration," Chicot County Drainage District v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374, 60
S.Ct. 317, 318, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), see also
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199, 93
S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (plurality opinion), and that to apply the new
rule to parties who relied on the old would
offend basic notions of justice and fairness.
But this equitable method has its own
drawback: it tends to relax the force of
precedent, by minimizing the costs of overruling, and thereby allowfs the courts to act
with a freedom comparable to that of legislatures. See United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 554-555, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 25892590, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213, 225, 81 S.Ct.
1052, 1058, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, a court may apply a new rule in
the case in wrhich it is pronounced, then
return to the old one with respect to all
others arising on facts predating the pronouncement. This method, which we may
call modified, or selective, prospectivity, enjoyed its temporary ascendancy in the criminal law during a period in which the Court
formulated new rules, prophylactic or otherwise, to insure protection of the rights of
the accused. See, e.g., Johtison v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16
L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18

L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Daniel v. Louisiana,
420 U.S. 31, 95 S.Ct. 704, 42 L.Ed.2d 790
(1975); see also Smith, supra, at
, 110
S.Ct., at
("During the period in which
much of our retroactivity doctrine evolved,
most of the Court's new rules of criminal
procedure had expanded the protections
available to criminal defendants"). On the
one hand, full retroactive application of
holdings such as those announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12
L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); and Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), would have "seriously
disrupted] the administration of our criminal laws[,] . . . requiring] the retrial or
release of numerous prisoners found guilty
by trustworthy evidence in conformity with
previously announced constitutional standards." Johnson, supra, 384 U.S., at 731,
86 S.Ct., at 1780. On the other hand, retroactive application could hardly have been
denied the litigant in the law-changing decision itself. A criminal defendant usually
seeks one thing only on appeal, the reversal of his conviction; future application
would provide little in the way of solace.
In this context, without retroactivity at
least to the first successful litigant, the
incentive to seek review would be diluted if
not lost altogether.
But selective prospectivity also breaches
the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the
rule of law generally. See R. Wasserstrom. The Judicial Decision 69-72 (1961).
44
We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from
among similarly situated defendants those
who alone will receive the benefit of a
'new' rule of constitutional law." Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-259, 89
S.Ct. 1030, 1039, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last
Resort, 37 Harv.LRev. 409, 425 (1924).
For this reason, we abandoned the possibili-
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ty of selective prospectivity in the criminal
context in Griffith v Kentucky, 479 U S
314, 328, 107 S Ct 708, 716, 93 L Ed 2d 649
(1987), even where the new rule constituted
a "clear break" with previous law, in favor
of completely retroactive application of all
decisions to cases pending on direct review
Though Griffith was held not to dispose of
the matter of civil retroactivity, see id, at
322, n 8, 107 S C t , at 712, n 8, selective
prospectivity appears never to have been
endorsed in the civil context Smith, 496
U S , at
, 110 S C t , at
(plurality
opinion) This case presents the issue
III
[1,2] Both parties have assumed the
applicability of the Chevron Oil test, under
which the Court has accepted prospectivity
(whether in the choice-of-law or remedial
sense, it is not clear) where a decision
displaces a principle of law on which re
hance may reasonably have been placed,
and where prospectivity is on balance war
ranted by its effect on the operation of the
new rule and by the inequities that might
otherwibe result from retroactive application See Chevron Oil, 404 U S , at 106107, 92 S C t , at 355 But we have never
employed Cheiron Oil to the end of mod
lfied civil prospectivity
The issue is posed by the -scope of our
disposition in Bacchus
In most decisions
of this Court, retroactivity both as to choice
of law and as to remedy goes without the
saying Although the taxpaying appellants
prevailed on the merits of their Commerce
Clause claim, however, the Bacchus Court
did not grant outright their request for a
refund of taxes paid under the law found
unconstitutional
Instead, we remanded
the case for consideration of the State's
arguments that appellants were "not entitled to refunds since they did not bear the
2

In fact the state defendant in Bacchus argued
for pure prospectivity under the criteria set
forth in Chevron Oil Co v Huson, 404 U S 97
92 S C t 349 30 L t d 2d 296 (1971) See Brief
for Appellee in Bacchus Import* Ltd v Dias,
O T 1 9 8 3 No 82-1565 p 19
It went on to
argue that 'even if" the challenged tax were

economic incidence of the tax but passed it
on as a separate addition to the price that
their customers were legally obligated to
pay " Bacchus, 468 U S , at 276-277, 104
S C t , at 3058 "These refund issues, . .
essentially issues of remedy," had not been
adequately developed on the record nor
passed upon by the state courts below, and
their consideration may have been intertwined with, or obviated by, matters of
state law Id, at 277, 104 S Ct, at 3058
Questions of remedy aside, Bacchus is
fairly read to hold as a choice of law that
its rule should apply retroactively to the
litigants then before the Court
Because
the Bacchus opinion did not reserve the
question whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it, compare
American Trucking ASSJIS , Inc v Schemer, 483 U S 266, 297-298, 107 S Ct 2829,
2847-2848, 97 L Ed 2d 220 (1987) (remanding case to consider whether ruling "should
be applied retroactively and to decide other
remedial issues"), it is properly understood
to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in civil cases If the Court
were to have found prospectivity as a
choice-of-law matter, there would have
been no need to consider the pass-through
defense, if the Court had reserved the
issue, the terms of the remand to consider
"remedial" issues would have been incomplete Indeed, any consideration of remedial issues necessarily implies that the precedential question has been settled to the
effect that the rule of law will apply to the
parties before the Court See McKesson,
496 U S , at
, 110 S C t , at
(passthrough defense considered as remedial
question) Because the Court in Bacchus
remanded the case solely for consideration
of the pass through defense, it thus should
be read as having retroactively applied the
rule there decided 2 See also Williams v
held invalid and the decision were not limited
to prospective application
the challengers
should not be entitled tu refunds because any
taxes paid would have been passed through to
consumers Id, at 46 Though unnecessary to
our ruling heie the prospectivity issue can thus
be said actually to have been litigated and by
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Vermont, 472 U.S. 14. 28, 105 S.Ct. 2465,
2474, 86 L.Ld.2d 11 (1985); Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton, 4(J2 U.S. 17(5. 11)6-197, 103 S.Ct.
2290, 2308-2309, 70 L.Kd.2d 497 (1983); cf.
Davis v. Michigan Dcpt. of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803. 817. 109 S.Ct. 1500, 1508, 103
L.Ed.2d 891 (1989).
Bacchus thus applied its own rule, just
as if it had reversed and remanded without
further ado, and yet of course the Georgia
courts refused to apply that rule with respect to the litigants in this case. Thus,
the question is whether it is error to refuse
to apply a rule of federal law retroactively
after the case announcing the rule has already done so. We hold that it is, principles of equality and stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chevron
Oil analysis.
Griffith cannot be confined to the criminal law. Its equality principle, that similarly situated litigants should be treated the
same, carries comparable force in the civil
context. See United States v. Estate of
Donnelly, 397 U.S., at 290, 90 S.Ct, at
1039 (Harlan, J., concurring). Its strength
is in fact greater in the latter sphere. With
respect to retroactivity in criminal cases,
there remains even now the disparate treatment of those cases that come to the Court
directly and those that come here in collateral proceedings. See Griffith, supra, 479
U.S., at 331-332, 107 S.Ct, at 717-718
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Whereas Griffith
held that new rules must apply retroactively to all criminal cases pending on direct review, we have since concluded that
new rules will not relate back to convictions challenged on habeas corpus. Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103
L.Ld.2d 334 (1989). No such difficulty exists in the civil arena, in which there is little
opportunity for collateral attack of final
judgments.
Nor is selective pros {activity necessary
to maiutain incentives to litigate in the civil
context as it may have been in the criminal
implication actually to have been decided by the
Court by the fact of itb consideration of the
pass-through defense. See CUmun* v. Musissip-

before Griffith 's rule of absolute retroactivity. In the civil context, "even a party
who is deprived of the full retroactive benefit of a new decision may receive some
relief." Smith, 490 U.S., at
, 110 S.Ct,
at
. Had the petitioners in Bacchus
lost their bid for retroactivity, for example,
they would nonetheless have won protection from the future imposition of discriminatory taxes, and the same goes for the
petitioner here. Assuming that pure prospectivity may be had at all, moreover, its
scope must necessarily be limited to a small
number of cases; its possibility is therefore
unlikely to deter the broad class of prospective challengers of civil precedent. See
generally Currier, Time and Change in
Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling,
51 Va.L.Rev. 201, 215 (1965).
Of course, retroactivity in civil cases
must be limited by the need for finality, see
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317,
84 L.Ed. 329 (1940); once suit is barred by
res judicata or by statutes of limitation or
repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door
already closed. It is true that one might
deem the distinction arbitrary, just as some
have done in the criminal context with respect to the distinction between direct review and habeas: why should someone
whose failure has otherwise become final
not enjoy the next day's new rule, from
which victory would otherwise spring? It
is also objected that in civil cases unlike
criminal there is more potential for litigants to freeioad on those without whose
labor the new rule would never have come
into being. (Criminal defendants are already potential litigants by virtue of their
offense, and invoke retroactivity only by
way of defense; civil beneficiaries of new
rules may become litigants as a result of
the law change alone, and use it as a weapon.) That is true of the petitioner now
before us, which did not challenge the
Georgia law until after its fellow liquor
pi, 494 U.S.
.
. n. 3. 110 S.Ct. 1441. 1448.
n. 3, 108 L.Bd.2d 725 (1990).

JAMKS B. BEAM DISTILLING CO. v. GEORGIA
Cite a* I ft S.Ct. 24J<* ( I W I )

distributors had won their battle in Bacchus. To apply the rule of Bacchus to the
parties in that case but not in this one
would not, therefore, provoke Justice Harlan's attack on modified prospectivity as
"(s]imply fishing one case from the stream
of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards,
and then permitting a stream of similar
cases to flow by unaffected by that new
rule." Mackey, 401 U.S., at G79, 91 S.Ct,
at 1173 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part), see
also Smith,
supra, at
, 110
S.Ct, at
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). Beam had yet to enter the waters at
the time of our decision in Bacchus, and
yet we give it Bacchus1 benefit Insofar as
equality drives us, it might be argued that
the new rule should be applied to those
who had toiled and failed, but whose claims
are now precluded by res judicata; and
that it should not be applied to those who
only exploit others' efforts by litigating in
the new rule's wake.
As to the former, independent interests
are at stake; and with respect to the latter,
the distinction would be too readily and
unnecessarily overcome.
While those
whose claims have been adjudicated may
seek equality, a second chance for them
could only be purchased at the expense of
another principle. " 'Public policy dictates
that there be an end of litigation; that
those who have contested an issue shall be
bound by the result of that contest, and
that matters once tried shall be considered
forever settled as between the parties.' "
Federated Department
Stores v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 401, 101 S.Ct 2424, 2429, 69
L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) (quoting Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283
U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 518, 75 L.Ed.
1244 (1931)). Finality must thus delimit
equality in a temporal sense, and we must
accept as a fact that the argument for
uniformity loses force over time. As for
the putative hangers-on, they are merely
asserting a right that the Court has told
them is theirs in law, that the Court has

not deemed necessary to apply on a prospective basis only, and that is not otherwise barred by state procedural requirements. They cannot be characterized as
freeloaders any more than those who seek
vindication under a new rule on facts arising after the rule's announcement Those
in each class rely on the labors of the first
successful litigant. We might, of course,
limit retroactive application to those who at
least tried to fight their own battles by
litigating before victory was certain. To
this possibility, it is enough to say that
distinguishing between those with cases
pending and those without would only
serve to encourage the filing of replicative
suits when this or any other appellate court
created the possibility of a new rule by
taking a case for review.
Nor, finally, are litigants to be distinguished for choice-of-law purposes on the
particular equities of their claims to prospectivity: whether they actually relied on
the old rule and how they would suffer
from retroactive application of the new. It
is simply in the nature of precedent, as a
necessary component of any system that
aspires to fairness and equality, that the
substantive law will not shift and spring on
such a basis. To this extent, our decision
here does limit the possible applications of
the Chevron Oil analysis, however irrelevant Chevron Oil may otherwise be to this
case. Because the rejection of modified
prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it
is not applied to others, the Chevron Oil
test cannot determine the choice of law by
relying on the equities of the particular
case. See Simpson v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation
Programs,
United States Dept. of Labor, 681 F.2d 81,
85^86 (CA1 1982), cert, denied sub nom.
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation
Programs,
United States Dept. of Labor, 459 U.S.
1127, 103 S.Ct 7G2, 74 L.Ed.2d 977 (1983);
see also Note, 1985 U.Iii.L.Rev. 117, 131132. Once retroactive application is chosen
for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for
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all others who might seek its prospective
application. The applicability of rules of
law are not to be switched on and off
according to individual hardship; allowing
relitigation of choice-of-law issues would
only compound the challenge to the stabilizing purjKJse of precedent posed in the first
instance by the very development of "new"
rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry
permits litigants to assert, and the courts
to consider, the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly situated. Conversely, nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities
when deciding remedial issues in particular
cases.

1039 (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. Lemon,
411 U.S., at 203, 93 S.Ct., at 1471.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
// is su

ordered.

Justice WHITE, concurring in the
judgment.

Nor do we speculate about the remedy
that may be appropriate in this case; remedial issues were neither considered below
nor argued to this Court, save for an effort
by petitioner to buttress its claim by reference to our decision last Term in McKesson. As we have observed repeatedly, federal "issues of remedy . . . may well be
intertwined with, or their consideration obviated by, issues of state law."
Bacchus,
468 U.S., at 277, 104 S.Ct., at 3058. Nothing we say here deprives respondent of his
opportunity to raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in
determining the nature of the remedy that
must be provided, a matter with which
McKesson did not deal. See Estate of
Donnelly, 397 U.S., at 2%, 90 S.Ct., at

1 agree with Justice SOUTER that the
opinion in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Diets,
468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200
(1984), may reasonably be read as extending the benefit of the judgment in that case
to the appellant Bacchus Imports. I also
agree that the decision is to be applied to
other litigants whose cases were not final
at the time of the Bacchus decision. This
would be true under any one of several
suppositions. First, if the Court in that
case thought its decision to have been reasonably foreseeable and hence not a new
rule, there would be no doubt that it would
be retroactive to all similarly situated litigants. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971),
would not then have been implicated. Second, even if retroactivity depended upon
consideration of the Chevron Oil factors,
the Court may have thought that retroactive application was proper.
Here, it
should be noted that although the dissenters
in
Bacchus—including
Justice
O'CONNOR—agreed that the Court erred
in deciding the Twenty-first Amendment
issue against the State, they did not argue
that the Court erred in giving the appellant
the benefit of its decision. Bacchus, supra, at 278, 104 S.Ct., at 3059 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). Third, even if—as Justice
O'CONNOR now argues—the Court was
quite wrong in doing so, post, at 24522456, that is water over the dam, irretrievably it seems to me. There being no precedent in civil cases applying a new rule to
the parties in the case but not to others
similarly situated,* and Griffith v. Ken-

* Sec Northern ft pelt ne Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.. 458 U.S. 50, 88. 102 S.Ct.
2858, 2880, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 142-143, 96 S.Ct. 612. 693. 46

U : d . 2 d 659 (1976); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97. 92 S.Ct. 349. 30 L.Kd.2d 296 (1971).
Cipnano v. City of Uotana. 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89
S.Ct. 1897. 1900. 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969); Allen v.

IV
The grounds for our decision today are
narrow. They are confined entirely to an
issue of choice of law: when the Court has
applied a rule of law to the litigants in one
case it must do so with respect to all others
not barred by procedural requirements or
res judicata. We do not speculate as to the
bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.
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tucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716,
93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), having overruled
such a practice in criminal cases (a decision
from which I dissented and still believe
wrong, but which I now follow on the basis
of stare decisis ), I agree that the petitioner here should have the benefit of Bacchus,
just as Bacchus Imports did. Hence I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Nothing in the above, however, is meant
to suggest that I retreat from those opinions filed in this Court which I wrote or
joined holding or recognizing that in proper
cases a new rule announced by the Court
will not be applied retroactively, even to
the parties before the Court. See, e.g.,
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,
706, 89 S.Ct 1897, 1900, 23 I,Ed.2d 647
(1969). This was what Justice Stewart
wrote for the Court in Chevron Oil summarizing what was deemed to be the essence of those cases. Chevron Oil, supra,
at 105-109, 92 S.Ct., at 355-357. This was
also what Justice O'CONNOR wrote for
the plurality in American
Trucking
Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S.
, 110
S.Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 1 joined
that opinion and would not depart from it.
Nor, without overruling Chevron Oil and
those other cases before and after Chevron
Oil, holding that certain decisions will be
applied prospectively only, can anyone sensibly insist on automatic retroactivity for
any and all judicial decisions in the federal
system.
Hence, I do not understand how Justice
SOUTER can cite the cases on prospective
operation, ante, at 2443, and yet say that
he need not speculate as to the propriety of
pure prospectivity, ante, at 2448. The propriety of prospective application of decision
in this Court, in both Constitutional and
statutory cases, is settled by our prior decisions. To nevertheless "speculate" about
the issue is only to suggest that there may
Stale Bd. oj Elections. 393 U.S. 544, 572, 89 S Ct
817, 835, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), Simpson v. Union
Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24-25, 84 S Ct. 1051, 10581059, 12 L.Ed.2d 98 (1964), England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiner*, 375 U.S

(mi)
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come a time when our precedents on the
issue will be overturned.
Plainly
enough,
Justices
SCALIA,
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN would depart from our precedents. Justice SCALIA
would do so for two reasons, as I read him.
Post, at
. First, even though the Justice is not naive enough (nor does he think
the Framers were naive enough) to be unaware that judges in a real sense "make"
law, he suggests that judges (in an unreal
sense, I suppose) should never concede that
they do and must claim that they do no
more than discover it, hence suggesting
that there are citizens who are naive
enough to believe them. Second, Justice
SCALIA, fearful of our ability and that of
other judges to resist the temptation to
overrule prior cases, would maximize the
injury to the public interest when overruling occurs, which would tend to deter them
from departing from established precedent.
I am quite unpersuaded by this line of
reasoning and hence concur in the judgment on the narrower ground employed by
Justice SOUTER.
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom
Justice MARSHALL and Justice SCALIA
join, concurring in the judgment.
I join Justice SCALIA's opinion because I
agree that failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to cases pending
on direct review violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication. It seems to me
that our decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649
(1987), makes clear that this Court's function in articulating new rules of decision
must comport with its duty to decide only
"cases'' and "controversies." See U.S.
Con»t., Art. Ill, § 2, el. 1. Unlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules to
"be applied prospectively only," as the dissent, post, at 24f>0, and perhaps the Court,
411, 422. 84 S.U 461, 468, 11 L.Hd.2d 440
(1964); Chicot County Drainage Ut*t. v. Baxter
State Bank. 308 U.S. 371. 374, 60 S Ct. 317, 318,
84 L.Ed. 329 (1940).

^nou
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would have it. The nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that
is actually before us, and, if it requires us
to announce a new rule, to do so in the
context of the case and apply it to the
parties who brought us the case to decide.
To do otherwise is to warp the role that we,
as judges, play in a government of limited
powers.
1 do not read Justice SCALIA's comments on the division of federal powers to
reject the idea expressed so well by the last
Justice Harlan that selective application of
new rules violates the principle of treating
similarly situated defendants the same.
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
678-679, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1172-1173, 28
L.Ed.2d 404 (1971), and Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-259, 89 S.Ct.
1030, 1038-1039, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969) (dissenting opinion), on which Griffith relied.
This rule, which we have characterized as a
question of equity, is not the remedial equity that the dissent seems to believe can
trump the role of adjudication in our constitutional scheme. See post, at 2451. It
derives from the integrity of judicial review, which does not justify applying principles determined to be wrong to litigants
who are in or may still come to court. We
fulfill our judicial responsibility by requiring retroactive application of each new rule
wre announce.
Application of new decisional rules does
not thwart the principles of stare decisis,
as the dissent suggests. See post, at 2452.
The doctrine of stare decisis profoundly
serves important purposes in our legal system. Nearly a half century ago, Justice
Roberts cautioned: "Respect for tribunals
must fall when the bar and the public come
to understand that nothing that has been
said in prior adjudication has force in a
current controversy." Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113, 64 S.Ct. 455,
463, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944) (dissenting opinion). The present dissent's view of stare
decisis would rob the doctrine of its vitality
through eliminating the tension between
the current controversy and the new rule.

ttbrUKTKK

By announcing new rules prospectively or
by applying them selectively, a court miy
dodge the stare decisis bullet by avoiding
the disruption of settled expectations that
otherwise prevents us from disturbing our
settled precedents. Because it forces us to
consider the disruption that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines
with stare, decisis to prevent us from altering the law each time the opportunity
presents itself.
Like Justice SCALIA, I conclude that
prospectivity,
whether
"selective" or
"pure," breaches our obligation to discharge our constitutional function.
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice
MARSHALL and Justice BLACKMUN
join, concurring in the judgment.
I think 1 agree, as an abstract matter,
with Justice SOUTER's reasoning, but that
is not what leads me to agree with his
conclusion. I would no more say that what
he calls "selective prospectivity" is impermissible because it produces inequitable results than I would say that the coercion of
confessions is impermissible for that reason. I believe that the one, like the other,
is impermissible simply because it is not
allowed by the Constitution. Deciding between a constitutional course and an unconstitutional one does not pose a question of
choice of law.
If the division of federal powers central
to the constitutional scheme is to succeed
in its objective, it seems to me that the
fundamental nature of those powers must
be preserved as that nature was understood when the Constitution was enacted.
The Executive, for example, in addition to
"tak(ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," Art. II, § 3, has no power to
bind private conduct in areas not specifically committed to his control by Constitution
or statute; such a perception of "[tjhe Executive jxjwer" may be familiar to other
legal systems, but is alien to our own. So
also, I think, "[t)he judicial Power of the
United States" conferred upon this Court
and such inferior courts as Congress may
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establish, Art. Ill, § 1, must be deemed to
be the judicial power as understood by our
common-law tradition. That is the power
"to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803),
not the power to change it. I am not so
naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as
to be unaware that judges in a real sense
"make" law. But they make it as judges
make it, which is to say as though they
were "finding" it—discerning what the law
is, rather than decreeing what it is today
changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.
Of course this mode of action poses "difficulties of a . . . practical sort," ante, at
2443, when courts decide to overrule prior
precedent. But those difficulties are one
of the understood checks upon judicial law
making; to eliminate them is to render
courts substantially more free to "make
new law," and thus to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three Branches.
For this reason, and not reasons of equity, I would find both "selective prospectivity" and "pure prospectivity" beyond our
power.
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Chief
Justice REHNQU1ST and Justice
KENNEDY join, dissenting.
The Court extends application of the new
rule announced in Bacchus Imports,
Ltd.
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82
L.Ed.2d 200 (1984), retroactively to all parties, without consideration of the analysis
described in Chevron Oil Co. v. Hxison,
404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296
(1971). Justice SOUTER bases this determination on "principles of equality and
stare decisis/*
Ante, at
. To my
mind, both of these factors lead to precisely the opposite result.
Justice
BLACKMUN
and
Justice
SCALIA concur in the judgment of the
Court but would abrogate completely the
Chevron Oil inquiry and hold that all decisions must be applied retroactively in all
cases. I explained last Term that such a
rule ignores well-settled precedent in which

this Court has refused repeatedly to apply
new rules retroactively in civil cases. See
American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 496
U.S.
.
, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 23272343, 110 LEd.2d 148 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). There is no need to repeat that
discussion here. I reiterate, however, that
precisely because this Court has "the power 'to say what the law is,' Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60
(1803)," ante, at 2450 (SCALIA, J., concurring), when the Court changes its mind, the
law changes with it. If the Court decides,
in the context of a civil case or controversy,
to change the law, it must make the subsequent determination whether the new law
or the old is to apply to conduct occurring
before the law-changing decision. Chevron Oil describes our long-established procedure for making this inquiry.
I
I agree that the Court in Bacchus applied its rule retroactively to the parties
before it. The Bacchus opinion is silent on
the retroactivity question. Given that the
usual course in cases before this Court is to
apply the rule announced to the parties in
the case, the most reasonable reading of
silence is that the Court followed i u customary practice.
The Bacchus Court erred in applying its
rule retroactively. It did not employ the
Chevron Oil analysis, but should have.
Had it done so, the Court would have concluded that the Bacchus rule should be
applied prospectively only. Justice SOUTER today concludes that, even in the absence of an independent examination of
retroactivity, once the Court applies a new
rule retroactively to the parties before it, it
must thereafter apply the rule retroactively to everyone. I disagree. Without a
determination that retroactivity is appropriate under Chevron Oil, neither equality
nor stare decisis leads to this result.
As to "equality," Justice SOUTER believes that it would be unfair to withhold
the benefit of the new rule in Bacchus to
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litigants similarly situated to those who
received the benefit in that case. Ante, at
2444, 2440. If Justice SOUTER is concerned with fairness, he cannot ignore
Chevron Oil; the purpose of the Chevron
Oil test is to determine the equities of
retroactive application of a new rule. See
Chevron Oil, supra, 404 U.S., at 107-108,
1)2 S.CL, at 3r>r>-;jf>(i; Smith, supra, at
, 110 S.Ct., at
. Had the Bacchus
Court determined that retroactivity would
be appropriate under Chevron Oil, or had
this C/Ourt made that determination now,
retroactive application would be fair.
Where the Chevron Oil analysis indicates
that retroactivity is not appropriate, however, just the opposite is true. If retroactive application was inequitable in Bacchus
itself, the Court only hinders the cause of
fairness by repeating the mistake. Because 1 conclude that the Chevron Oil test
dictates that Bacchus not be applied retroactively, I would decline the Court's invitation to impose liability on every jurisdiction
in the Nation that reasonably relied on
prt-Bacchus law.
Justice SOUTER also explains that
"stare decisis11 compels its result.
Ante,
at 244G. By this, I assume he means that
the retroactive application of the Bacchus
rule to the parties in that case is itself a
decision of the Court to which the Court
should now defer in deciding the retroactivity question in this case. This is not a
proper application of stare decisis.
The
Court in Bacchus applied its rule retroactively to the parties before it without any
analysis of the issue. This tells us nothing
about how this case—where the Chevron
Oil question is squarely presented—should
come out.
Contrary to Justice SOUTER's assertions, stare decisis cuts the other way in
this case. At its core, stare decisis allows
those affected by the law to order their
affairs without fear that the established
law upon which they rely will suddenly be
pulled out from under them. A decision
not to apply a new rule retroactively is
based on principles of stare decisis.
By

not applying a law-changing decision retroactively, a court respects the settled expectations that have built up around the old
law. See, American Trucking, supra, at
, 110 S.Ct, at 2341 (opinion of
O'CONNOR, J.) ("prospective overruling
allows courts to respect the principle of
stare decisis even when they are impelled
to change the law in light of new understanding"); id., at
, 110 S.Ct, at 2345
(SCA1JA, J., concurring in judgment) (im
position of retroactive liability on a litigant
would "upset that litigant's settled expectations because the earlier decision for
which stare decisis effect is claimed ...
overruled prior law. That would turn the
doctrine of stare decisis against the very
purpose for which it exists"). If a Chevron Oil analysis reveals, as it does, that
retroactive application of Bacchus would
unjustly undermine settled expectations,
stare decisis dictates strongly against the
Court's holding.
Justice SOUTER purports to have restricted the application of Chevron Oil
only to a limited extent. Ante, at 2447.
The effect appears to me far greater. Justice SOUTER concludes that the Chevron
Oil analysis, if ignored in answering the
narrow question of retroactivity as to the
parties to a particular case, must be ignored also in answering the far broader
question of retroactivity as to all other
parties. But it is precisely in determining
general retroactivity that the Chevron Oil
test is most needed; the broader the potential reach of a new rule, the greater the
potential disruption of settled expectations.
The inquiry the Court summarized in Chevron Oil represents longstanding doctrine
on the application of nonretroactivity to
civil cases. See American Trucking, supra, at
, 110 S.Ct, at
. Justice SOUTER today ignores this
well-established precedent, and seriously
curtails the Chevroyi Oil inquiry. His reliance upon stare decisis in reaching this
conclusion becomes all the more ironic.
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II
Faithful to this Court's decisions, the
Georgia Supreme Court in this case applied
the analysis described in Chevron Oil in
deciding the retroactivity question before
it. Subsequently, this Court has gone out
of its way to ignore that analysis. A proper application of Chevron
Oil demonstrates, however, that Bacchus should not
be applied retroactively.
Chevron Oil describes a three-part inquiry in determining whether a decision of
this Court will have prospective effect only:
"First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle
of law, either by overruling clear past
precedent on which litigants may have
relied, or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed. Second, . . . we
must . . . weigh the merits and demerits
in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.
Finally, we [must] weig[h] the inequity
imposed by retroactive application, for
[wjhere a decision of this Court could
produce substantial inequitable results if
applied retroactively, there is ample basis
in our cases for avoiding the injustice or
hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity." 404 U.S., at 106-107, 92 S.Ct., at
355 (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
BacchiLS easily meets the first criterion.
That case considered a Hawaii excise tax
on alcohol sales that exempted certain locally produced liquor. The Court held that
the tax, by discriminating in favor of local
products, violated the Commerce Clause,
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, by interfering
with interstate commerce. 468 U.S., at
273, 104 S.Ct, at 3056. The Court rejected
the State's argument that any violation of
ordinary Commerce Clause principles was,
in the case of alcohol sales, overborne by
the State's plenary powers under § 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment to the United
States Constitution. That section provides:

' T h e transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The Court noted that language in some
of our earlier opinions indicated that § 2
did indeed give the States broad power to
establish the terms under which imported
liquor might compete with domestic. See
468 U.S., at 274, and n. 13, 104 S.Ct., at
3057, and n. 13. Nonetheless, the Court
concluded that other cases had by then
established
"that
the
[Twenty-first]
Amendment did not entirely remove state
regulation of alcoholic beverages from the
ambit of the Commerce Clause." Id., at
275, 104 S.Ct., at 3057. Relying on Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324, 84 S.Ct. 1293, 12 L.Ed.2d 350
(1964), California Retail Liquor Dealers
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980),
and Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580
(1984), the Court concluded that § 2 did not
protect the State from liability for economic protectionism. 468 U.S., at 275-276, 104
S.Ct., at 3057-3058.
The Court's conclusion in Bacchus was
unprecedented.
Beginning with
State
Board of Equalization
of California
v.
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 57 S.Ct.
77, 81 L.Ed. 38 (1936), an uninterrupted line
of authority from this Court held that
States need not meet the strictures of the
so-called "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause when regulating sales and
importation of liquor within the State.
Young's Market
is directly on point
There, the Court rejected precisely the argument it eventually accepted in Bacchus.
The California statute at issue in Young's
Market imposed a license fee for the privilege of importing beer into the State. The
Court concluded that "(p]rior to the Twenty-first Amendment it would obviously
have been unconstitutional to have imposed
any fee for that privilege" because doing
so directly burdens interstate commerce.
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299 U.S., at 62, 57 S.Ct., at 78. Section 2
changed all of that. The Court answered
appellees' assertion that § 2 did not abrogate negative Commerce Clause restrictions. The contrast between this discussion and the Court's rule in Bacchus is
stark:
"[Appeilees] request us to construe the
Amendment as saying, in effect: The
State may prohibit the importation of
intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits
the manufacture and sale within its borders; but if it permits such manufacture
and sale, it must let imported liquors
compete with the domestic on equal
terms. To say that, would involve not a
construction of the Amendment, but a
rewriting of it.
"The plaintiffs argue that, despite the
Amendment, a State may not regulate
importations except for the purpose of
protecting the public health, safety or
morals; and that the importer's license
fee was not imposed to that end. Surely
the State may adopt a lesser degree of
regulation than total prohibition. Can it
be doubted that a State might establish a
state monopoly of the manufacture and
sale of beer, and either prohibit all competing importations, or discourage importation by laying a heavy impost, or channelize desired importations by confining
them to a single consignee?" Id., at
62-63, 57 S.Ct., at 78-79.
Numerous cases following Young's Market are to the same effect, recognizing the
States' broad authority to regulate commerce in intoxicating beverages unconstrained by negative Commerce Clause restrictions. See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves,
308 U.S. 132, 138, 60 S.Ct. 163, 166, 84
L.Ed. 128 (1939); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 299, 65
S.Ct. 661. 664. 89 L.Ed. 951 (1945); Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35, 42, 86 S.Ct. 1254, 1259, 16 L.Ed.2d 336
(1966); Heublein, Inc. v. South
Carolina
Tax Cornm'n, 409 U.S. 275, 283-284, 93
S.Ct. 483, 488-489, 34 L.Ed.2d 472 (1972);
see generally Bacchus, supra, at 281-282,

104 S.Ct., at 3060-3061 (STEVENS, J., dusenting).
The cases that the Bacchus Court cited
in support of its new rule in fact provided
no notice whatsoever of the impending
change. Idle wild, Mi den I, and Capital
Cities, supra, all involved States' authority
to regulate the sale and importation of
alcohol when doing so conflicted directly
with legislation passed by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Commerce
Clause. The Court in each case held that
§ 2 did not give Suites the authority to
override congressional legislation. The:*
essentially were Supremacy Clause cases,
in that context, the Court concluded that
the Twenty-first Amendment had not "repealed" the Commerce Clause. See Idlcu?ild, supra, 377 U.S., at 331-332, 84 S.Ct., at
1297-1298; Midcal, supra, 445 U.S., at
108-109, 100 S.Ct., at 944-945; Capital
Cities, supra, 467 U.S., at 712-713, 104
S.Ct., at 2707.
These cases are irrelevant to Bacchus
because they involved the relation between
§ 2 and Congress' authority to legislate
under the (positive) Commerce Clause.
Bacchus and the Young's Market line concerned States' authority to regulate liquor
unconstrained by the negative Commerce
Clause in the absence of any congressional
pronouncement. This distinction was clear
from Idleunld, Midcal, and Capital Cities
themselves. Idle.wild and Capital Cities
acknowledged explicitly that § 2 trumps
the negative Commerce Clause. See Idlewild, supra, 377 U.S., at 330, 84 S.Ct., at
1296 (" 'Since the Twenty-first Amendment,
. . . the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is
not limited by the commerce clause — ' " ) ,
quoting Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Cornm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394,
59 S.Ct. 254, 255, 83 L.Ed. 243 (1939); Capita/ Cities, supra, 467 U.S., at 712, 104
S.Ct., at 2707 f 4This Court's decisions ...
have confirmed that the [Twenty-first]
Amendment primarily created an exception
to the normal operation of the Commerce
Clause/ . . . § 2 reserves to the States pow-

C i t e * * 111 S.< . 2439 < l * * t )

er to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent
the Amendment, would clearly be invalid
under the Commerce Clause"), quoting
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206, 97 S.Ct.
451, 461, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).
In short, Bacchus' rule that the Commerce Clause places restrictions on state
power under § 2 in the absence of any
congressional action came out of the blue.
Bacchus overruled the Young's
Market
line in this regard and created a new rule.
See Bacchus, 468 U.S., at 278-287, 104
S.Ct., at 3059-3064 (STFA'ENS, J., dissenting) (explaining just how new the rule of
that case was).
There is nothing in the nature of the
Bacchus rule that dictates retroactive application. The negative Commerce Clause,
which underlies that rule, prohibits States
from interfering with interstate commerce.
As to its application in Bacchus, that purpose is fully served if States are, from the
date of that decision, prevented from enacting similar tax schemes. Petitioner James
Beam argues that the purposes of the Commerce Clause will not be served fully unless Bacchus is applied retroactively. The
company contends that retroactive application will further deter States from enacting
such schemes. The argument fails. Before our decision in Bacchus, the State of
Georgia was fully justified in believing that
the tax at issue in this case did not violate
the Commerce Clause. Indeed, before Bacchus it did not violate the Commerce
Clause. The imposition of liability in hindsight against a State that, acting reasonably would do the same thing again, will
prevent no unconstitutionality. See American Trucking, 496 U.S., at
, 110 S.Ct.,
at

(opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).

Precisely because Bacchus was so unprecedented, the equities weigh heavily
against retroactive application of the rule
announced in that case. "Where a State
can easily foresee the invalidation of its tax
statutes, its reliance interests may merit
little c o n c e r n . . . . By contrast, because the
State cannot be expected to foresee that a

decision of this Court would overturn established precedents, the inequity of unsettling actions taken in reliance on those
precedents
is apparent."
American
Trucking, supra, at
, 110 S.Ct., at
2333 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). In this
case, Georgia reasonably relied not only on
the Young's Market line of cases from this
Court, but a Georgia Supreme Court decision upholding the predecessor to the tax
statute at issue. See Scott v. Georgia, 187
Ga. 702, 705, 2 S.E.2d 65, 66 (1939), relying
on Young's Market
and
Indianapolis
Brewing.
Nor is there much to weigh in the balance. Before Bacchus, the legitimate expectation of James Beam and other liquor
manufacturers was that they had to pay
the tax here at issue and that it was constitutional. They made their business decisions accordingly. There is little hardship
to these companies from not receiving a tax
refund they had no reason to anticipate.
The equitable analysis of Chevron Oil
places limitations on the liability that may
be imposed on unsuspecting parties after
this Court changes the law. James Beam
claims that if Bacchus is applied retroactively, and the Georgia excise tax is declared to have been collected unconstitutionally from 1982 to 1984, the State owes
the company a $2.4 million refund. App. 8.
There are at least two identical refund actions pending m the Georgia courts. These
plaintiffs seek refunds of almost $28 million. See Heublein, Inc. v. Georgia, Civ.
Action No. 87-3542-6 (DeKalb Super.Ct.,
Apr. 24, 1987); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc. v. Georgia, Civ.Action No. 877070-8 (DeKalb Super.Ct., Sept. 4, 1987).
Brief for Respondents 26, n. 8. The State
estimates its total potential liability to all
those taxed at $30 million. Id., at 30. To
impose on Georgia and the other States
that reasonably relied on this Court's established precedent such extraordinary retroactive liability, at a time when most
States are struggling to fund even the
most basic services, is the height of unfairness.
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We are not concerned here with a Stale
that reaped an unconstitutional windfall
from its taxpayers. Georgia collected in
good faith what was at the tune a constitutional tax. The Court now subjects the
State to potentially devastating liability
without fair warning. Tins burden will fall
not on .some corrupt slate government, but
ultimately on the blameless and unexpecting citizens of Georgia in the form of higher taxes and reduced benefits. Nothing in
our jurisprudence compels that result; our
traditional analysis of retroactivity dictates
against it.
A fair application of the Chevron Oil
analysis requires that Bacchus not be applied retroactively. It should not have
been applied even to the parties in that
case. That mistake was made. The Court
today compounds the problem by imposing
widespread liability on parties having no
reason to expect it. This decision is made
in the name of "equality" and "stare decisis/'
By refusing to take into account the
settled expectations of those who relied on
this Court's established precedents, the
Court's decision perverLs the meaning of
both those terms. I respectfully dissent.
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Establishments wishing to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment and
individual dancers employed at establish-

